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Variations on a Theme:
Comparing the Concept of "Necessity" in International
Investment Law and WTO Law
Andrew D. Mitchell* and Caroline Henckelst
Abstract
The concept of "necessiy" is used in many legal systems to delimit permissible from
prohibitedmeasures where such measures negatively affect the regime 'sprimay values, such as
human rights, liberaliz'edtrade, andprotectionofforeign investment. Internationalinvestment
tribunals have adopted a variey of approaches to the question of whether a measure is

"necessagy" to achieve its objective in relationto a number ofprovisions of investment treaties,
including non-precluded measures clauses and fair and equitable treatment. Yet their
approaches to thisform of analysis are inconsistentandgeneraly not analyticaly robust. By
comparison, WTO tribunalshave developed relatively sophisticatedmethodsfor analyzing a

measure's necessi_0 to achieve its objective in the context of generalexceptions, sanitary and
phytosanitagy measures and technical regulations. The WTO approachgenerally takes into
account a number offactors, including the importance of a measure's objective, a measure's
effectiveness at achieving that objective, and the availabiliy of alternative measures.

Importantly, WTO tribunalsgeneraly undertake this analysis with a degree of deference, in
recognition of the right ofgovernments to set their own poliy priorities.Investment tribunals
could usefully employ aspects of the WITO approach to necessi' in the context of non-precluded

PhD, Cambridge; LLM, Harvard; Graduate Diploma Intl Law, LLB, BCom, Melbourne.
Professor, Melbourne Law School, The University of Melbourne; Barrister & Solicitor, Supreme
Court of Victoria and the High Court of Australia. Mitchell can be reached at
a.mitchell@unimelb.edu.au.
PhD, Cambridge; LLM, Melbourne; LLB, Wellington; Barrister & Solicitor, Supreme Court of
Victoria and the High Court of New Zealand. Henckels can be reached at
caroline.henckels@gmail.com. The authors would like to thank Glyn Ayres for his invaluable
research assistance. We would also like to thank Jos6 Alvarez, George-Dian Balan, Jan Bohanes,
Tegan Brink, Diane Desierto, David Heaton, Jfirgen Kurtz, Simon Lester, Gabrielle Marceau,
Kate Miles, James Munro, Federico Ortino, Georgio Sacerdoti, Stephan Schill, Thomas Schultz,
Robert Sloane and Tania Voon for their comments on an earlier draft. Any errors or omissions
are ours alone.

ChicagoJournalof InternationalI-an,

measures,fair and equitable treatment, non-discrimination,and non-expropriation.Such an
approachwouldgo some way toward the development of a consistent, coherent bod of cases in
relation to the concept of necessity in internationalinvestmentlaw,providinggreatercertainlfor
both host states and investors.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The concept of "necessity" plays an important role in many legal systems
to delimit permissible measures from those that are incompatible with rights or
interests protected by that legal system.' This Article compares the approaches
to the analysis of necessity by ad hoc tribunals constituted under investment
treaties with the approach taken by World Trade Organization panels and the
Appellate Body (WTO tribunals). In particular, the Article compares the use of
this form of analysis to delimit permissible state measures from measures in
violation of treaty obligations in international investment law and WTO law. It
examines, in this regard, non-precluded measures clauses and the doctrines of
fair and equitable treatment, non-discrimination, and non-expropriation in
international investment law in comparison with WTO general exceptions
provisions' and rules on sanitary and phytosanitary measures and technical
regulations.
While international trade and investment are regarded as increasingly
inseparable, they remain separately regulated in international law. 3 Yet both
regimes frequently rule on the lawfulness of legislation and other measures
adopted by governments in the public interest in terms of their compliance with
the government's obligations affecting commercial entities, and in this respect,
perform common functions. Disputes may be brought in both arenas relating to
the same subject matter: international investment law and WTO law both
provide aggrieved producers and service suppliers with the opportunity to seek
redress (although a government must bring a claim on behalf of such interests
before the WTO). The recent challenges to Australia's legislation mandating
plain packaging of tobacco, as well as the series of disputes between Mexico and
the United States in relation to high fructose corn syrup, exemplify this
phenomenon.4
I
2

3

4

See Tarcisio Gazzini, Wouter G. Werner, and Ige F. Dekker, Necessiy across InternationalLaw: An
Introduction, 41 Netherlands YB Intl L 3, 3 (2010).
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article)X, 61 Stat A-11,TIAS 1700, 55 UN TreatySer
194 (1947) (GAT).
See, for example, Nicholas DiMascio and Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscriminationin Trade and Investment
Treaties: WorldsApart orDifferentSidesofthe Same Coin?, 102 Am J Intl L 48, 48-50 (2008); Gus Van
Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitrationand Public Law 78-79 (Oxford 2007).
See Philip Morris Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia (UNCITRAL Arbitration), online at
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1309.pdf (visited Apr 10,
2013); World Trade Organization, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Ukraine,
Australia-CertainMeasums Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain PackagingRequirements Applicable to
Tobacco Products and Packaging, VTO Doc No WT/DS434/11 (Aug 17, 2012); World Trade
Organization, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Honduras, Australia-CertainMeasures
Concerning Trademarks, GeographicalIndications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to
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The potential for conflicting outcomes between the two regimes is of both
theoretical and practical concern for states and investors alike, an issue that is
compounded by the divergent approaches to finding state liability within
international investment law itself. Given that a tribunal's determination of
whether or not a measure is "necessary" to achieve its objective may be crucial
to the outcome of a given case (as a measure that is not necessary will violate the
state's obligations), this inconsistency in analytical approaches negatively impacts
the certainty and predictability of international investment law. Investment
tribunals have also faced opprobrium for interpreting investment treaties in a
way that does not provide sufficient space for host states to enact new legislation
and take other actions in the public interest. In this regard, a principled approach
to testing the legality of a measure, in terms of its necessity to achieve a bona
fide regulatory objective, is important in achieving an interpretation of
international investment law that reflects an appropriate balance between the
interests of both investors and host states. A more consistent and disciplined
approach to necessity may deal with these criticisms and accommodate host
states' regulatory autonomy to a greater extent. This Article aims to determine
whether WXTO law might be of assistance to investment tribunals in this respect.
Section I[ of the Article discusses the technique of necessity analysis in
treaty-based regimes, highlighting the analytical stages and various
methodologies an adjudicator may employ. Section I]I analyzes how
international investment tribunals have determined the issue of necessity in
relation to non-precluded measures, fair and equitable treatment, indirect
expropriation and national treatment. Section IV assesses how WTO tribunals
dealt with the issue of necessity in the context of general and security exceptions,
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and technical regulations. Section V reflects
on the emergence of an approach to necessity influenced by WTO case law in
the context of international investment law, and discusses the relevance of the
WTO approach to international investment law. Section VI concludes that there
are several aspects of WTO tribunals' approaches to necessity analysis from
Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc No WT/DS435/16 (Oct 17, 2012); World Trade
Organization, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the Dominican Republic, AustraliaCertain Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain PackagingRequirementsApplicable to Tobacco
Products and Packaging, WTO Doc No WT/DS441/15 (Nov 14, 2012); Archer Daniels Midland
Companyv The UnitedMexicanStates,ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/04/05, (Award of Nov 21, 2007),
online at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal
=showDoc&docld=DC782_En&caseld=C43 (visited Apr 10, 2013) (Archer Daniels v Mexico);
Corn Products International, Inc v The United Mexican States, ICSlD Case No ARB (AF)/04/01,
Decision on Responsibility (Jan 15, 2008), online at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType= CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC1 012_En&caseld=C29
(visited Apr 10, 2013); World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Mexico-Tax
Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WTO Doc No WT/DS308/AB/R (Mar 6, 2006)
(Mexico-Soft Drink).
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which international investment tribunals could usefully draw guidance when
determining the permissibility of measures affecting foreign investors. These are:
assessing the importance of a measure's objective, testing a measure's
effectiveness and permitting measures to pass this stage of review when they
have the potential to achieve their objective in the future, undertaking leastrestrictive means analysis in a manner that is sensitive to host states' technical,
institutional and budgetary capacities, and taking a consistent approach to the
burden of proof.

II. NECESSITY ANALYSIS IN CONTEXT
A. Overview
In international law, the concept of necessity has two separate meanings
and functions. Under customary international law, a measure taken in relation to
a state of necessity is a measure that is unlawful in normal circumstances, but
may nonetheless be adopted by a state in exceptional circumstances, where the
measure is the only means available to protect the state's essential interests
against a grave and imminent danger.5 The customary plea of necessity may only
be argued where a breach of an international obligation is established according
to the primary rules of the particular regime (be theyjus ad bellum, environmental
law, or other areas of international law); the defense operates as a secondary rule
to determine whether this wrongfulness is precluded.6 In this respect, the plea of
necessity provides "a shield against an otherwise well-founded claim for the
breach of an international obligation." 7 Among several strict prerequisites, the
plea requires that the measure adopted be "the only means available" to deal
with the situation.8 As such, invocation of the state of necessity imposes an
extremely high threshold.
However, the concept of necessity has a different meaning and function in
a number of treaty-based regimes. It functions as a means of determining
whether authorities may permissibly promulgate a measure that restricts or limits
a right or interest protected by the legal regime (such as free trade, unimpeded

5
6

United Nations, DraftArticles on the Responsibili!)y of Statesfor Internationally WrongulActs, UN Doc
A/56/10 at Art 25 (2001).
See, for example, August Reinisch, NecessiyinlnvestmentArbitration,41 NetherlandsYB Intl L 137,
148-49, 156 (2010).
Commentaries to the DraftArficles on Responsibiliyof Statesfor International WrongulActs, adopted by
the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session (2001), Official Records of the
General Assembly, fifty-sixth session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), 71. See DraftAricles,Art 25
(cited in note 5).
DraftAricles,Art 25 (cited in note 5).
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use of an investment, or human rights). In this context, the test of necessity
operates to delimit the permissibility of state conduct that negatively affects a
right or interest protected by the regime's primary rules, rather than as a
justification or excuse for non-performance of the state's obligations. 9 It is this
latter concept of necessity that this Article will explore further.
B. Necessity Testing in Treaty-Based Regimes
"Necessity" may be described as a term that has no inherent or ordinary
meaning in relation to whether a measure is necessary to achieve a particular
objective. Accordingly, courts and tribunals developed criteria by which to
determine whether a measure is necessary."0 Generally speaking, the test has
been interpreted as a requirement of "the least restrictive means," requiring a
state to choose, from all potential measures that would advance its desired
objective, the measure that would least limit the protected right or interest."
This form of necessity testing is employed in a wide variety of legal systems,
including in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and in a number of domestic legal
systems.
Undertaking least-restrictive means analysis is predicated on a court or
tribunal's initial finding that a measure pursues a legitimate policy objective. 12
Where the treaty provision is open-ended or does not specify the policy
objective that would justify limiting a right or interest, a court or tribunal must
identify and evaluate the legitimacy and importance of the regulatory objective in
terms of the public interest it is intended to serve. For example, the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides that contracting states may
promulgate measures restricting the right to property "in the public interest.""
In addition, the mandatory requirements doctrine, created by the CJEU,
provides that member states may adduce grounds of justification for measures
limiting free movement that do not have a basis in the treaty text, which requires
the CJEU to assess the legitimacy of the objective of a challenged measure. 4

1

DraftArticles,Art 25 (cited in note 5).
Jiirgen Kurtz, Adjudging the Exceptional at International Investment Law: Securiy, Public Order and
FinancialCrisis, 59 Intl & Comp L Q 325, 337 (2010).
See Aharon Barak, Proportionalioy:ConstitutionalRights and Their Limitations 317 (Cambridge 2012).

12

See, for example, id at 321.

13

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950),
213 UN Treaty Ser 221, Protocol 1, Art 1 (1953) (ECHR).

14

See Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltungfiir Branntwein, Case 120/78, 1979 ECR 649 8
(1979); Griinne de Bdrca, The Principleof Proportionalioyand its Application in EC Law, 13 YB Eur L
105, 126 (1993); Takis Tridimas, The GeneralPrinciples of EU Law 212 (Ox ford 2d ed 2006).

9

10
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Also, certain provisions in WTO agreements are open-ended as to the types of
policy objectives that may be invoked in relation to the measures restricting
trade.'" An adjudicator's role in this respect is to filter out exercises of power in
pursuit of ostensible public interests that cannot ever justify limiting protected
rights and interests, such as protectionist or discriminatory conduct, rather than
engaging in substitutionary review of the importance of the measure's
objective. 6 By contrast, some treaty provisions set out a list of regulatory
purposes that have already been determined to be legitimate by virtue of their
inclusion in the treaty provision. Here, the adjudicator's role is limited to
ascertaining whether the stated objective comes within one of the permissible
areas. For example, GATT Article XX and GATS Article X1V specify lists of
permissible objectives,17 as does Article 36 of the EU Treaty. 8

16

Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Annex I A to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Art 2.2, 1867 UN Treaty Ser 3 (1995) (TBT Agreement). GAIT,
Art XX(d) (cited in note 2).
T. Jeremy Gunn, DeconstructingProportionaliyin LimitationsAnalysis, 19 Emory Intl L Rev 465, 490

17

(2005); Mark Elliott, Proporionafi{y and Deference: The Importance of a Structured Approach, in
Christopher Forsyth, et al, eds, Effective Judicial Review A Cornerstone of Good Governance 264, 281
(Oxford 2010).
GATT, Art XX (cited in note 2) provides that Members may take measures affecting international

15

18

trade where necessary for the protection of public morals (XX(a)) and human, animal, or plant life
or health (XX(b)); measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations not
otherwise inconsistent with the agreements (XX(d)) (although this provision is itself open -ended);
and measures "involving restrictions on exports of domestic materials necessary to ensure
essential quantities of such materials to a domestic processing industry during periods when the
domestic price of such materials is held below the world price as part of a governmental
stabilization plan" (XX(i)). The other enumerated exceptions contain different nexus
requirements: "relating to" the importations or exportations of gold or silver (XX(c)), the
products of prison labor (XX(o), and the conservation of exhaustible natural resources (XX(g));
"imposed for" the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic, or archaeological value
(XX(f); "undertaken in pursuance of' obligations under any intergovernmental commodity
agreement (XX(h)) and "essential to" the acquisition or distribution of products in general or
local short supply (XX(j)). See also the references to necessity in General Agreement on Trade in
Services, Art XIV(a), (b), and (c), Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol 1, 1867
UN Treaty Set 183 (1995) (GATS); Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, Art 2.2, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol 1, Annex 2 A, 1867 UN
Treaty Ser 493 (1995) (SPS Agreement), which controls measures "necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health."
Treaty on European Union, Art 36, 2002 OJ (C 325) 5 (Feb 7, 1992) (EU Treaty) lists the
permitted reasons for derogations from free movement of goods as "[plublic morality, public
policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the
protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the
protection of industrial and commercial property." Similar derogation provisions exist in relation
to the other freedoms (Articles 45(3), 52, 62, and 65).
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Analysis of the necessity of a measure is also logically predicated on a
finding that the measure is rationally connected to or suitable to achieve its
objective. A court or tribunal must determine whether the measure has the
capacity to achieve its aim or, in other words, whether there is a causal
relationship between the measure and its objective.19 Further, in many legal
systems, a finding that a measure is necessary to achieve its objective will then
lead the court or tribunal to perform a balancing test by weighing the
importance of the underlying regulatory objective with the right or interest at
stake (for example, cost to trade, investment or human rights) and hence to
decide whether the deleterious impact on the relevant right or interest is
proportionate to the measure's avowed public benefit.2" This is an approach
adopted by, for example, the CJEU and ECtHR, and is beginning to emerge in
investment treaty arbitration.2'
It should also be noted that least-restrictive means analysis is only relevant
where the achievement of the objective is possible through the use of more than
one alternative measure, and that an alternative measure would impair the right
or interest to a lesser degree. 2 Any alternative measure must also achieve the
objective as effectively.23 Strictly speaking, if an alternative measure exists that
would be less harmful to the protected right or interest and would equally
advance the measure's purpose, the impugned measure is not "necessary" to
achieve its objective.24 The question of whether any alternatives exist is by no
means always straightforward, particularly in complex policy areas involving the
allocation of resources and other issues involving the consideration and
balancing of a number of divergent interests.2 "

19

See, for example, Barak, Proporionalityat 303-05 (cited in note 11).

20

See, for example, id at 342-44.
See, for example, Technicas Medioambientales Teemed SA vMexico, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/2,

21

(Award of May 29, 2003), online at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?request
Type=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC602_En&caseld=C1 86 (visited Apt 12, 2013)
(TecmedvMexico); Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands)v The Czech Republic, Partial Award (Perm
Ct Arb 2006) (Saluka v Czech Republic); TotalSA vArgentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/04/1,
(Decision on Liability of Dec 27, 2010), online at http://italaw.com/documents/
TotalvArgentinaDecisionOnLiabilty.pdf (visited Apr 11, 2013) (Total vArgentina) (employing or
proposing various manifestations of proportionality analysis in the context of international
investment law, but not adverting to necessity analysis in terms of least -restrictive means testing).

23

Julian Rivers, Proportionality,Discretionand the Second Law of Balancing in George Pavlakos, ed, Law,
Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy 167, 171, 177 (Oxford 2007); Barak,
Proportionaliyat 317-18, 321, 323 (cited in note 11).
Rivers, Proportionality,Discretionandthe SecondLaw of Balancingat 171, 177 (cited in note 22); Barak,

24

Proportionalityat 317-18, 321, 323 (cited in note 11).
Barak, Proportionalityat 317 (cited in note 11).

25

Rivers, Proportionality,Discretionand the Second Law of Balancing at 185 (cited in note 22).

22
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Analyzing the necessity of a measure requires a court or tribunal to have a
detailed appreciation of the measure's context, its objective and the probability
of this objective being achieved through alternative means. It requires
adjudicators to evaluate hypothetical alternatives and predict their impact on the
protected right or interest, as well as their efficacy at achieving the relevant
objective.26 Adjudicators must also select the evaluative criteria by which to
measure the cost to the state of an alternative measure compared with the state's
chosen measure.
C. The Nexus Requirement
The degree of scrutiny undertaken by courts and tribunals when
performing necessity analysis varies from strict scrutiny to a high degree of
deference, depending upon factors including the court or tribunal's
constitutional role or position within a legal system and any textual articulation
of the necessity test. At one end of the spectrum, Article 144 of the EU Treaty
uses the term "strictly necessary" in relation to measures taken in relation to a
balance of payments crisis,27 and Article 15 of the ECHR permits member states
to derogate from their obligations during wartime or other public emergency
only "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. "' At the
other end, some treaty provisions permit states a high degree of discretion in the
determination of a measure's necessity. For example, GATT Article XX(b)
provides that "nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any
contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests"; and Article 1(2) of the First
Protocol to the ECHR provides that "[t]he preceding provisions shall not ...
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control
the use of property in accordance with the general interest."

26

Jan H. Jans, Proporfionaliy Reisited, 27 Legal Issues Econ Integr 239, 241 (2000); Rivers,

27

Proporlionaliy,Discretionand the Second Law of Balancingat 185 (cited in note 22); Elliott, Proportionali4
and Deference at 264 (cited in note 16); Barak, Proportionaliyat 321 (cited in note 11).
EU Treaty, Art 144 (cited in note 18) provides:

28

Where a sudden crisis in the balance of payments occurs ... a Member State
with a derogation may, as a precaution, take the necessary protective measures.
Such measures must cause the least possible disturbance in the functioning of
the internal market and must not be wider in scope than is strictly necessary to
remedy the sudden difficulties which have arisen.
ECHR, Art 15 (cited in note 13) provides:
(1) In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation
any 1High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations
under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other
obligations under international law.
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Absent an express stipulation of the standard of review in relation to the
term "necessary" in the treaty text, adjudicators frequently afford the state some
latitude in its assessment of whether there are less restrictive measures
reasonably available. Authorities are required only to demonstrate a reasonable
basis for the conclusion that the chosen measure was necessary or to meet an
otherwise lowered standard of proof, rather than to show that the absolutely
least restrictive alternative was selected.29 Various courts and tribunals take the
approach (particularly in cases where legislative action is taken to deal with a
complex issue) that a measure will not be unlawful simply because the court or
tribunal can conceive of a less restrictive alternative, as there may be a range of
ways to solve the problem and factual uncertainty as to which will be the most
effective.' This technique is described as an assessment of whether a measure is
"reasonably necessary" rather than "strictly necessary."3
The "reasonably necessary" test is also relevant where an adjudicator needs
to address the inability of the necessity test to permit consideration of broader
public policy issues. A strict approach to necessity only assesses the measure's
primary objective and not other interests (for example, environmental concerns,
undue administrative complexities or financial implications) that may be affected
adversely by selecting another option that impairs the protected right or interest
to a lesser degree.32 Adjudicators may therefore permit authorities to adduce
evidence to demonstrate that a particular measure should not be adopted due to
the fact that it unacceptably generates negative externalities. The reasonably
necessary approach permits the decisionmaker to choose a measure that would
avoid harm to broader interests, including undue administrative or fiscal burdens
on the state 33 or (in the case of EU and ECHR law) harm to other rights and
interests recognized by the legal regime that would result from adoption of the

29

De Bfrca, 13 YB Eur L at 111 (cited in note 14); Mads Andenas and Stefan Zleptnig,

31

Proportionafiy: WITO Law: in Comparative Perspective, 42 Tex Intl L J 371, 392-93 (2006); Elliott,
Proportionali'yand Deference at 269 (cited in note 16).
See Aileen Kavanagh, DeferenceorDefiance?TheLimits of theJudicialRolein ConstitutionalAdjudication,
in Grant Huscroft, ed, Expounding the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional "1"henry 184, 191
(Cambridge 2008); Barak, Proportionalityat 409, 411 (cited in note 11).
and Deference at 278 (cited in note 16). See also jud Matthews and Alec Stone
Elliott, Proportionaliy

32

Sweet,AlI Things in Proportion?American Rights Review andthe Problem of Balancing 60 Emory L J 797,
803 (2010-11).
Kurtz, 59 Intl & Comp L Q at 369 (citedin note 10); Elliott, ProportionaliyandDeference at 277-78

30

(cited in note 16).
33

See, for example, World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Measures
308, WTO Doc No
Affecting the Cross Border Supply of Gambling and Beting Services
WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr 7, 2005) (US-Gambling).
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least restrictive means.' In other words, authorities may be granted latitude to
triangulate the right or interest, the regulatory objective and wider considerations
which might otherwise be prejudiced if the least restrictive means were
selected.3"
While the focus of this Article concerns the nexus requirement of
necessity, it should be noted that this is not the only nexus requirement
appearing in treaty provisions that provide space for states to pursue legitimate
policy objectives, or that have been used by courts and tribunals to delimit
permissible measures. For example, certain provisions of the WTO agreements'
general exceptions provisions (discussed in greater detail in Section IV) provide
that states may promulgate measures affecting international trade "relating to"
the importation or exportation of gold or silver, the products of prison labor,
and the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, or "imposed for" the
protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value. 36
Non-precluded measures clauses in investment treaties also differ with respect to
the required nexus between a measure and its objective, as discussed in the
following section. Other provisions of investment treaties provide a variety of
nexus requirements: for example, investment treaties based on the US Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) state that regulations that are "designed and
applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health,
safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations."3
III. THE USE OF NECESSITY ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW
A. Overview
The series of claims brought by US investors against Argentina in relation
to emergency measures adopted in the context of its economic crisis gave rise to
34

35

36
37

Tridimas, Tbe General Principles of EU Law at 214 (cited in note 14); Elliott, Proportionalityand
Deference at 278-80 (cited in note 16).
This approach is not without criticism, on the basis that necessity analysis is designed to assess the
relationship between the measure and its underlying objective rather than the legitimacy of the
objective itself, taking into account broader factors. This critique holds that the legitimacy of the
primary objective and of any wider policy consideration, such as fiscal implications or harm to
other rights or interests, should logically be established prior to the consideration of the necessity
of the measure. The concept of reasonable necessity therefore conflates the question of necessity
with the question of whether the public policy objective is legitimate. Elliott, Proportionaliyand
Deference at 278-80 (cited in note 16).
See GATT, Arts XX (c), (e), (f) and (g) (cited in note 2).
Diplomacy in Action, 2012 USModel Bilaterallnvestmentlreaty,Annex B 4(b) (US Department of
State 2012), online at http://www.state.gov/documents/organzation/188371.pdf (visited Apr 12,
2013).
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a number of tribunal decisions dealing with the concept of "necessity" in
international investment law. Tribunals were required to determine whether the
measures complied with the terms of a non-precluded measures clause in the
US-Argentina BIT. But this is not the only area of investment law in which
tribunals have employed necessity analysis. A number of tribunals have used
necessity analysis in their assessment of whether host state conduct breaches the
obligations of fair and equitable treatment, national treatment and, arguably,
non-expropriation. Necessity analysis is used in these latter contexts as a means
of determining whether the primary norm has been breached where that norm
permits a degree of regulatory freedom for host states-for example, in relation
to regulating emerging threats to human health or the environment-rather than
as a means of determining whether a measure that is primafaie in breach of the
host state's obligations is nevertheless permissible in the circumstances.
Necessity analysis, in this respect, functions as a means for tribunals to
determine whether measures taken in pursuit of particular public policy
objectives impact investment no more than is required to achieve the particular
objective. While these two areas differ in terms of the role of necessity
analysis-determining the contours of the primary norm vis-a-vis justifying an
otherwise prohibited measure-both contexts use the same analytical
technique. 8
With the exception of non-precluded measures clauses, investment treaties
do not typically address the relationship between substantive standards of
investor protection and host states' continuing ability to regulate and take other
actions in the public interest-either in general or by stipulating the required
nexus between a measure and its objective. The decided cases in international
investment law demonstrate a high degree of variance with respect to this nexus
requirement. Unlike WTO jurisprudence, which has evolved over a number of
years and is disciplined by the oversight of the Appellate Body, any principles
emerging from the body of decided cases remain fragmented and embryonic. It
is difficult to say with certainty (a) whether a tribunal will adopt a necessitybased approach, at least outside the context of non-precluded measures clauses
that specifically prescribe such a nexus requirement, and (b) how a tribunal will
address the nexus requirement using the concept of necessity. With these caveats
in mind, the cases will be explored.

38

See Federico Ortino, Basic Legal Instrumentsfor the Liberalisationof Trade: A ComparativeAnaysis of
EC and WTO Law 388 (Oxford 2004).
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Measures: From Strict to Flexible Necessity

1. Overview.
Non-precluded measures clauses (NPM clauses) set out the circumstances
in which a state may promulgate a measure or otherwise act in a manner
inconsistent with its substantive obligations toward investors.39 Such clauses aim
to preserve host states' regulatory autonomy and in so doing, reverse the general
allocation of risk of state action impacting investment from states to investors.'
Rather than directing tribunals to take into account investor protection and the
public interest pursued by the host state in determining whether the substantive
standard of investment protection has been violated (such as tribunals may do in
relation to, for example, fair and equitable treatment), these treaty provisions
direct tribunals to take into account these competing imperatives in analyzing
whether a prima facie breach is nevertheless excused."
Several features of NPM clauses, including limited permissible policy
objectives and nexus requirements, set the boundaries of their applicability.
These features determine whether the host state or the investor will ultimately be
responsible for the costs to the investor arising from the measure.42 First, the
broader the range of permissible objectives, the greater the degree of flexibility
retained by host states to regulate or take other actions in the public interest.43
Permissible policy areas allowed by these provisions can cover a range of
circumstances, but typically relate to areas of public policy touching on the core
governmental functions of the state, and contain amorphous or open-textured
terms." The most frequently seen exceptions are security or international peace

41

Such provisions regularly appear in investment treaties concluded by Germany, India, the BelgianLuxembourg Union, Canada, and the US, but remain in the minority of investment treaties.
However, they are becoming more prevalent, which may evidence negotiating states' intentions to
maintain a degree of regulatory autonomy in relation to sensitive areas, including social and
environmental issues. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, in BilateralInvestment
Treaties 1995-2006: TrendsinInvestment Rulemaking 142 (United Nations 2007); Suzanne A. Spears,
The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of InternationalInvestment Agreements, 13 J Intl Econ L
1037, 1043-44 (2010).
William W. Burke-White and Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinay Times: The
InterpretationandApplicationof Non-PrecludedMeasuresProvisionsin BilateralInvestment Treaties, 48 Va J
Intl L 307, 401-02 (2008).
Spears, 13 J Intl Econ L at 1059-60 (cited in note 39).

42

Burke-White and von Staden, 48 VaJ Intl L at 329 (cited in note 40).

43

Anne Van Aaken, InternationalInvestment Law between Commitment and Flexibilioy: A ContractTheoiy
Analysis, 12J Intl Econ L 507, 523-24 (2009).

44

Burke-White and von Staden, 48 VaJ Intl L at 349-66, 403 (cited in note 40).

39

40
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and security,4" public order,46 public health47 and public morality. 8 Less
frequently observed exceptions include "extreme emergency,"49 conservation of
natural resources5" and prudential measures aimed at the security and
predictability of the financial system."s The provisions also differ in their scope:
some apply to all substantive investor protections, whereas others apply only to
non-discrimination requirements. 2
Second, NPM clauses differ in the requirement as to the nexus between a
measure and its objective: some require that a measure be "necessary to" achieve
the objective, whereas others require only that the measure be "proportional
to, '53 "appropriate to,"5 4 "related to,''15 "directed to, ' 56 ,for," or "designed and
45

46

47

48

49
50

51

See, for example, Treaty Between United States of America and the Argentine Republic
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (1991), US-Arg, 31
]LM 124 at Art XI.
See, for example, Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Uganda-Belgium-Luxembourg (2005), Art 3.2.
See, for example, Agreement Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the People's
Republic of China on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (2003), GetChina, 2362 UN Treaty Ser 253 4 (2003).
See, for example, Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (1996),
Czech Rep-India, Art 12.
See, for example, Agreement for the Promotion of Investments (1996), Czech Rep-India, Art 12.
See, for example, Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
Eastern Republic of Uruguay for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (1997), CanUruguay, Annex I III 2(c).
Id at 5 III 3(c).

52

Compare Ger-China, Art 4(a) (cited in note 47) ("Measures that have to be taken for reasons of
public security and order, public health or morality shall not be deemed 'treatment less favourable'
within the meaning of Article 3") with US-Arg, Art XI (cited in note 45) ("Nothing in this Treaty
shall be construed ... to preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for
the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international
peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interest.").

53

See, for example, BilateralAgreementforthe Promotionand Protectionof Investments Between the Republic of
Colombian Model August 2007, Art 8 (International Institute for Sustainable
Colombia and
Development 2007), online at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/inv model bit colombia.pdf
(visited Apr 13, 2013).
See, for example, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Investment Agreement for
the Comesa Common Investment Area, Art 22:2, online at http://vi.unctad.org/files/
wksp/iiawksp08/docs/wednesday/Exercise%2Materials/invagreecomesa.pdf (visited Apr 13,
2013).

54

55

56

Compare

Canadian Model Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement, Art 10(4)
(International Treaty Arbitration 2004), online at http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004FIPA-model-en.pdf (visited Apr 13, 2013), with GATT, Art XX(g) ("relating to the conservation
of exhaustible natural resources') (cited in note 2).
New Zealand and China, Agreement on the Promotion of Investment (1988), 1787 UN Treaty
Ser 186 at Art 11 (1994).
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applied" 8 to further one of the permissible objectives. The nexus requirement
will determine both the required relationship between the measure and its
objective and, consequentially, the level of scrutiny that a tribunal would be
expected to direct at the relationship between the policy objective and the
measure selected to achieve it. A requirement of necessity invites a least
restrictive means analysis, whereas a requirement of "related to" contemplates a
less stringent nexus requirement."9 While this Article focuses on the NPM clause
in the Argentina-US BIT with the nexus requirement of "necessary," this form
of analysis will not be appropriate in cases where the text of the relevant
provision provides alternative interpretive guidance to tribunals.
Further, some NPM clauses are explicitly self-judging. 6 A self-judging
treaty provision permits a state to unilaterally determine the existence of
preconditions to derogating from their primary treaty obligations, and requires a
court or tribunal to limit review to whether the host state has invoked the clause
in good faith.6 In this respect, investment tribunals would be precluded from
engaging in substantive review of whether a measure is necessary to achieve its
objective. However, no self-judging clause has to date been the subject of
adjudication in the international investment law context.
2. Background to the Argentine claims.
In investor-state arbitration, NPM clauses have been adjudicated upon
exclusively in relation to a series of claims against Argentina arising from its
2001 economic crisis. The first tranche of claims concerned a detailed and
complex regulatory framework, specifically devised by Argentina following the
57

58

59

60

61

Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (2001), India-Croatia,
Art 12:2, online at http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/croatia-india.pdf (visited Apr
13, 2013).
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Art 22:1 (cited in note 54).
See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD Series on International
Investment Policies for Development, T/he Protection of National Securi#y in IIAs,
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2008/5 94-95 (2009).
For example, North American Free Trade Agreement (1992), 32 ILM 289 at Art 2102(1) (1993)
(NAFTA); Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, Art 22(2) (Australian Department of
Foreign
Affairs
and
Trade
2005),
online
at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/
ausfta/final-text/ (visited Apr 13, 2012). See, generally, Stephan Schill and Robyn Briese, '7f the
State Considers ": Self-Judging Clauses in InternationalDisputeSettlement, 13 Max Planck YB UN L 61
(2009).
See Case ConcerningCertain.QuestionsofMutualAssistance in CriminalMatters (Djiboutiv France), 2008
ICJ 171, 229 (June 4, 2008):
[Vhile it is correct ... that the terms of [the self-judging clause] provide a
State to which a request for assistance has been made with a very considerable
discretion, this exercise of discretion is still subject to the obligation of good
faith codified in Article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
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privatization of public utilities to promote the stability of the tariff regime in
order to attract foreign investors in the electricity and gas utilities sectors.
Argentina reformed monetary policy by pegging the peso to the US dollar,
passing legislation allowing utility providers to charge tariffs in US dollars and
providing that these tariffs could be adjusted in line with US inflation.6 2 A
former state monopoly on gas transportation and distribution was divided into
several companies in which a number of US and UK investors acquired shares.6 3
As is well-known, Argentina's economy subsequently floundered, developing
into a state of crisis in late 2001. In response to the crisis, the parliament passed
the far-reaching Emergency Law that, inter alia, froze tariffs for utilities, depegged the peso from the US dollar, which removed utility providers' ability to
calculate tariffs in US dollars and adjust them in line with inflation, and pesified
contracts formerly in US dollars. These measures resulted in a sharp decline in
the value of the peso, causing financial losses to foreign investors. The law also
required renegotiation of licenses, froze bank deposits and the transfer of funds
abroad, rescheduled term deposits and reduced interest rates. 64
Tribunals hearing the electricity and gas sector claims largely found that
Argentina's actions breached the fair and equitable treatment standard, as the
investors' expectations had been frustrated through a lack of stability in the legal
environment upon which the investors based their decisions to invest. 65 Other

62

See Kurtz, 59 Intl & Comp L Q at 330-31 (cited in note 10).

63

CMS Gas TransmissionCompany vArgentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01 /8, (Award of July 17,
58, online at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType
2013) at
=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC503_En&caseld=C4 (visited Apr 13,2013) (CMS v
Argentina (Award)); LG&E Energy Corp. v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/1, (Decision on
52, online at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Front
Liability of Oct 3, 2006) at
Servlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC627_En&caseld=C208 (visited
Apr 13, 2013) (LG&E v Argentina); Enron Corporation PonderosaAssets L.P. v Argentine Republic,
47-54, online at
ICSID Case No ARB/01 /3, (Decision on Jurisdiction of Aug 2, 2004) at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontSerlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc
&docld=DC02 En&caseld=C3 (visited Apr 13, 2013) (Enron v Argentina); Sempra Energy
Internationalv Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/02/16, (Award of Sept 28, 2007) at 83,
88-92, online at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&
actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC694 En&caseld=C8 (visited Apr 13, 2013) (Sempra vArgentina);
24-26 (UNCITRAL 2007) (BG v
BG Group Pl v The Republic of Argentina, Final Award,
Argentina).
See, for example, Diane A.Desierto, Necessit and "Supplementay Means ofInterpretation"forNPM in
BilateralInvestment Treaties, 31 U PaJ Intl L 827, 831 (2010).
273-81 (cited in note 63); LG&E v
CMS v Argentina (Award), ICSID Case No ARB/01/8 at
Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/1 at IM 132-39 (cited in note 63); Enron vArgentina, ICSID
Case No ARB/01/3 at % 264-68 (cited in note 63); Sempra v Argentina, ICSID Case No
ARB/02/16 1303-04 (cited in note 63); BG vArgentina, Final Award at IM303-10 (cited in note
63); ElPasoEnergy InternationalCompany vArgentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/15, (Award
of Oct 31, 2011) at IN 510-17, online at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?

64
65
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tribunals hearing claims by investors in other sectors (such as water and
sewerage and in relation to holders of government bonds) also found Argentina
to be in breach of fair and equitable treatment and/or expropriation in relation
to the emergency measures and other conduct related to the crisis. ' Argentina
argued that the measures that it took were necessary to deal with the economic
crisis and that the crisis situation could justify the abrogation of its obligations to
investors, by relying on Article XI of the Argentina-US BIT in relation to
disputes taken by US investors and on the customary plea of necessity. In all
cases where Argentina argued the customary plea, it was unsuccessful.
In determining whether Argentina could rely on the customary plea,
tribunals relied upon the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the
ResponsibiityofStatesforInternationally WrongfulActs (the Articles) to determine the
contours of the defense.6" Article 25 provides that necessity may only be invoked
to preclude the wrongfulness of an act that does not comply with a state's
international obligations where, inter alia, that act is "the only way for the State

66

67

requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC51 lEn&caseld=Cl 7 (visited Apr 13,
2013) (El Paso v Argentina); National Grid PILV v The Argentine Republic, Award,
175, 178-80
(UNCITRAL 2008); Total vArgentina, ICSID Case No ARB/04/01 at IM 166-75, 180, 325-38
(cited in note 21); EDFInternationalSA, SAUR InternationalSA and Lebn ParticipacionesArgentinas
SA vArgenine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/23, (Award of June 11, 2012) at I 970, 994,
online at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1069.pdf (visited Apr 13,
2013).
Continental Casualy v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/9, (Award of Sept 5, 2008) at
215, 217, online at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf (visited
Apr 13, 2013) (Continental Casualy vArgentina); Sue, Sociedad General de Aguas de BarcelonaSA and
InteraguaSerticiosIntegrales de Agua SAv Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/17, (Decision
on Liability of July 30, 2010) at
215, 217, online at http://italaw.com/documents/
SuezlnterAguaDecisiononLiability.pdf (visited Apr 13, 2013) (InterAgua v Argentina); Sue Sociedad
General de Aguas de Barcelona SA and Vivendi Universal SA v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No
ARB/03/19, (Decision on the Proposal for the Disqualification of Oct 22, 2007) at
235, 237,
online at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=
showDoc&docld=DC693_En&caseId=Cl9 (visited Apr 13, 2013) (AWG vArgentina); Ipregilo
SpA v Argenine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/07/17, (Award of June 21,2011) at 7 325, 331,
online at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itaO4l8.pdf (visited Apr 13,
2013) (Impregilo v Argentina); SAUR InternationalSA v Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case
No ARB/04/4, (Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability of June 6, 2012) at 7 401-05; 504-05,
online at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italO15.pdf (visited Apr 13,
2013).
The ILC Articles set out the circumstances in which the wrongfulness of conduct under
international law may be precluded, including force majeure, distress, and necessity. The
International Court of Justice confirmed that the ILC Articles reflect customary international law
in Case Concerning the GaTkovo-Nagymaros Project(Hungary v Slovakia), 1997 JCJ 41, 52 (Sept 25,
1997) and LegalConsequences ofthe Construction of a Wall in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory, 2004 ICJ
133, 195, T 140 (July 9, 2004).
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to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril."68 The
Commentaries to the Articles clarify the "only way" requirement, stating that
"any conduct going beyond what is strictly necessary for the purpose will not be
covered" and that the defense will be precluded where there are any other
options available to the state to safeguard the essential interest, even where they
are "more costly or less convenient."' 69
3. Early cases on Article XI.
In contrast to the stringent prerequisites of the customary plea, Article XI
of the Argentina-US BIT permits measures "necessary for" achieving the
permissible objectives. Article XI of the Argentina-US Treaty provides:
This treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures
necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international
peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.
Article XI is silent as to the nature of the required relationship between the
measure and its objective, as opposed to the customary plea's detailed
prerequisites, indicating the parties' intention that the scope of Article XI would
be broader (and thus the standard of review less strict) than the customary plea. "
However, the first three tribunals to consider Article XI-CMS, Enron and
Senpra-adopted similar approaches, holding that Article XI reflected the
customary plea with respect to the definition of necessity and the preconditions
for its operation, including the "only way" requirement."

69

The other prerequisites are: that the act does not seriously impair an essential interest of the state
or states towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole; that
the international obligation in question does not exclude the possibility of invoking necessity; and
that the state has not contributed to the situation of necessity.
Commentariesto the DraftArticleson ResponsibiSty of StatesforInternationall ,WrongfulA cts at 83, 85 15

70

(cited in note 7).
See Kurtz, 59 Intl & Comp L Q at 347 (cited in note 10).

68

71

The CMS Tribunal found that Argentina could not rely on the customary plea, and held that
Article XI confirmed its interpretation of customary international law, implicitly finding that the
criterion under Article X was not met either. CMS v Argentina (Award), ICSID Case No
320 (cited in note 63), 323, 324, 329, 355, 356, 374. The Enron and Sempra
ARB/01/8 at
tribunals both held that Article XI was "inseparable" from the customary international law
standard. Sempra v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/16 at 376 (cited in note 63); Enron v
Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/01/3 at 334 (cited in note 63). These tribunals conflated the
treaty exception with the international law defense. As Kurtz notes, this approach is inconsistent
with the principle of effectivenessin treaty interpretation, in the sense that it would render Article
XI redundant as the customary defense would be available in any event. Kurtz, 59 Intl & Comp L
Q at 342, 344, 355 (cited in note 10). See also Burke-White and von Staden, 48 Va J Intl L at 321,
323, 493 (cited in note 40).
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All three awards were subject to applications for annulment.72 The Enron
annulment committee 73 remarked that host states should be permitted to adopt
measures more likely to be effective to achieve their objective (even where those
measures had a negative impact on investors) over measures that impacted less
on investors but were less likely to be effective.74 It also pointed to the problem
of determining the necessity of a measure with the benefit of knowledge and
hindsight that was unavailable to the state at the time of the measure's adoption.
The committee questioned whether a tribunal should "determine whether, on
the basis of information reasonably available at the time that the measure was
adopted, a reasonable and appropriately qualified decisionmaker would have
concluded that there was a relevant alternative open to the State."" The
committee's discussion is an acknowledgement that states acting in response to
emergencies are operating under significant pressure, time constraints and
informational limitations.

72

73

ICSID Convention,

Regulations and Rules, Art 52(1) (ICSID Apr 2006), online at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRREnglish-final.pdf (visited Apr 10,
2013) provides:
[E]ither party may request annulment of the award by an application in writing
addressed to the Secretary-General on one or more of the following grounds:
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the Tribunal has
manifestly exceeded its powers; (c) that there was corruption on the part of a
member of the Tribunal; (d) that there has been a serious departure from a
fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) that the award has failed to state the
reasons on which it is based.
The Sempra decision was annulled due to the tribunal's failure to consider the applicability of
Article XI. SempraEnergyInternaionalvArgentine Republic vArgenina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/16,
Decision on the Argentine Republic's Application for Annulment of the Award (June 29, 2010) at
208-09, online at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&
actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC1550_En&caseld=C8 (visited Apr 13, 2013).
The Enron Tribunal decision was annulled for failure to state the legal test for the customary plea,
instead stating it preferred the evidence of Enron's economic expert over Argentina's in relation
to the question of necessity, which meant that it had also failed to state the legal test for the
application of Article XI. Enron CorporationPonderosaAsselsLP vArgentine Republic, ICSID Case No
ARB/01 /3, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic (July 30, 2010)
at IN 373, 376-77, online at http://italaw.com/documents/EnronAnnulmentDecision.pdf
(visited Apr 13, 2013) (EnronvArgentina (Annulment)).

74

Id at

75

Id at 372 (also asking whether customary international law recognized "that reasonable minds
might differ in relation to such a question, and give a 'margin of appreciation' to the State in
question," meaning that the relevant question for a tribunal was "whether it was reasonably open
to the State, in the circumstances as they pertained at the relevant time, to form the opinion that
no relevant alternative was open").

371.
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The CMS annulment committee, while declining to annul the award, found
serious errors of law in the decision. 6 The committee emphasized that Article
XI and the customary plea should be addressed separately: compliance with the
provisions of a treaty, including meeting the requirements of a NPM clause,
means that there is no treaty violation, whereas invocation of the customary plea
is predicated on a finding of unlawfulness in terms of the primary rules
applicable to the legal regime. 7 The committee's decision clearly influenced the
methodology of subsequent tribunals with respect to both Article XI and the
customary plea.78
4. A more deferential approach to necessity: LG&E and Continental.
The LG&E v Argenlina Tribunal was the first to examine Article X1 as an
independent obligation. This decision, and the decision of the ContinentalCasual#
v Argentina Tribunal, demonstrate an approach to necessity analysis that comes
closer to that taken by WTO tribunals and other supranational and international
courts and tribunals.
The LG&E Tribunal stated that when a situation engaging the state's
essential security interests arose, it would be "necessary" for the state to
intervene. 79It held that while a state might have several options available to deal
with the crisis, the measures adopted were nevertheless "necessary" and
"legitimate" in terms of the NPM clause." The Tribunal took into account the
urgency of the measures, their expedited drafting process, and the fact that there
was evidence that Argentina had considered the interests of foreign investors in
the policymaking process. 8 This latter consideration appeared to function as a
procedural justification: if the state could demonstrate that it took the interests
of foreign investors into account, this might suffice in terms of the criterion of
necessity. In holding that a measure may be adjudged as necessary even if there
are other options available to the state, the LG&E Tribunal's approach gave
Argentina a degree of latitude in formulating its policy response. Argentina's
defense was accepted with a temporal limitation, the Tribunal finding that after
76

CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01 /8, Decision of the
Ad Hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic (Sept 25, 2007)
=
129-36, online at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType
at
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC687_En&caseld=C4 (visited Apr 13, 2013).

77

Id at T 129. See Reinisch, 41 Netherlands YB Intl L at 148-49 (cited in note 6).
Reinisch, 41 Netherlands YB Intl L at 156 (cited in note 6). However, where a NPM clause is
invoked, tribunals may proceed to assess whether the preconditions for its applicability are met
"since such finding may make a closer analysis of BIT violations superfluous."

78

80

LG&E vArgenlina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/1 at
Id at M239-40, 242.

81

Id at

79

226 (cited in note 63).

240.
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the immediate crisis had passed, its measures were disproportionate to the threat
to national security existing at that time.82 Having found that Argentina could
rely on Article XI, the Tribunal also opined that the customary international law
defense supported its conclusion.83 In relation to the "only way" criterion of the
customary plea, it stated that "an economic recovery package was the only
means to respond to the crisis," and that while "there may have been a number
of ways to draft the economic recovery plan, the evidence before the Tribunal
demonstrates that an across-the-board response was necessary, and the tariffs on
public utilities had to be addressed." '
The LG&E decision has been met with mixed opinions. On the one hand,
the impossibility of meeting the "only means" threshold, particularly in the
context of economic measures, means that a more deferential approach to
Article XI is apposite.8" Yet the Tribunal's approach is also criticized for being
cursory and unprincipled. The Tribunal's approach to the interpretation of the
"only way" requirement of the customary plea was highly unorthodox, it
referred to the "legitimacy" of the measure without further explication, and it
applied a convoluted standard of review, appearing to meld least-restrictive
means testing with review for good faith.86 It is arguable that this approach
would permit measures to pass muster even if they were wholly ineffective.8"
The Tribunal in Continentalalso interpreted Article XI in a vastly different
manner from previous awards. Like the LG&E Tribunal, its approach permitted
greater discretion to Argentina to craft its legislative response to the crisis. The
Tribunal, presided over by the former chairperson of the WTO Appellate Body,
82

Id at

195.

83

LG&E vArgentina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/1 at

84

Id at

85

Stephan Schill, InternationalInvestment Law and the Host State's Power to Handle Economic Crises-

86

Commenton the ICSID Decision in LG&E vArgentina, 24J Intl Arb 265,280-81 (2007); William W.
Burke-White, 1'Ihe
Argentine Financial Crisis:State Liabili under BIs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID
System, 3 Asian J WTO & Intl Health L & Poly 199, 218 (2008). See also Reinisch, 41 Netherlands
YB Intl L at 154 (cited in note 6) (proposing that tribunals "incorporate considerations of
adequacy and proportionality when assessing the appropriateness of the measures taken by host
States to counter a state of necessity").
Kurtz, 59 Intl & Comp L Q at 355-56 (cited in note 10); August Reinisch, Necessio in International

87

Investnment Arbitration-An Unnecessaiy Split of Opinions in Recent ICSID Cases? Comments on CMS v
Argentina and LG&E v Argentina, 3 Transnatl Disp Mgmt 11 (2006) (arguing that this approach
would permit a measure to pass muster even if it was "wholly inadequate to respond to the
crisis"); William W. Burke-White and Andreas Von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere:
The Standardof Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 Yale J Intl L 283, 324-25 (2010).
Christina Binder and August Reinisch, Economic Emergency Powers:A Comparative Law Perspective, in

245, 258 (cited in note 63).

257.

Stephan Schill, ed, InternationalInvestment Law and Comparative Public Law 75, 101, 511 (Oxford
2010); Kurtz, 59 Intl & Comp L Q at 356 (cited in note 10); Reinisch, 41 Netherlands YB Intl L
at 154 (cited in note 6).
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was strongly influenced by the WTO's approach to Article XX of the GATT,
holding that WTO law was a more appropriate comparator than the customary
plea as a source of interpretation of the concept and requirements of necessity in
the context of economic measures.88 The decision was the first decision in
relation to a NPM clause to engage in this form of cross-fertilization,
demonstrating the increasing willingness of investment tribunals to acknowledge
the interconnectedness of international economic law's different strands.8 9
As a basis for its comparative approach, the ConlinentalTribunalreferred to
the Appellate Body's decision in Korea-Bef,90 which set out its approach to the
meaning of "necessary" in GATT Article XX (which is followed in GATS
Article XJV). The Appellate Body stated that while "necessary" could have a
number of different meanings on a continuum from "indispensable" to "making
a contribution to," its meaning in the context of Article XX was closer to (but
did not embody) "indispensable." 9' As summarized by the ContinentalTribunal,
the Appellate Body has also stated that the determination of necessity requires
'''a process of weighing and balancing of factors' which usually includes
assessment of . . . the importance of the interests or values furthered by the
challenged measures, the contribution of the measure to the realization of the
ends pursued by it, and the restrictive impact of the measure on international
commerce."92 A measure will not be necessary if another WTO-consistent or
88

The Tribunal held that the textual basis of Article XI was derived from similar clauses of US
friendship, commerce and navigation treaties, which in turn reflected the formulation of Art. XX
of the GATT. ContinentalCasua1ty vArgentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/09 at 192 (cited in note
66). Giorgio Sacerdoti also chaired the subsequent Total v ArgentinaTribunal, which did not follow

this approach. See Jose E Alvarez and Tegan Brink, Revisiting the Necessity Defense: Continental
Casualty v Argentina, in Karl P. Sauvant, ed, Yearbook on InternationalInvestment Law & Polic 319,
89

338-45 (Oxford 2011).
See Benedict Kingsbury and Stephan Schill, Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors' Rights nith State
RegulatoyActions in the Public Interest-The Concept of Proportionality,in Stephan Schill, ed, International
Investment Lawand Comparative PublicLaw 75, 101 (Ox ford 2010); Reinisch, 41 Netherlands YB Intl
L at 156 (cited in note 6). Investment tribunals have, however, extensively referred to WTO
jurisprudence in relation to national treatment. See Jirgen Kurtz, 7/he Use andAbuse of VT'O Law
in Investor-State Arbitration: Competition and its Discontents, 20 Eur J Intl L 749 (2009) and Jiirgen

Kurtz, The Merits and Limits of Comparativism:NationalTreatmentin InternationalInvestment Law and the
Vf/TO, in Stephen Schill, ed, InternationalInvestment Law and Comparative Public Law 243 (Oxford
90

2010).
World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Korea-MeasuresAffectinglmportsof Fresh,
Chilled and Frozen Beef, WTO Doc Nos WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec 11, 2000)

(Korea-Beej).
91

Idat 161.

92

Continental Casualty v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/09 at 194 (cited in note 66), citing
Reports of the Appellate Body, Korea-Beefat 164 (cited in note 90); World Trade Organization,
Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContaining Products 172, WTO Doc No WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar 12, 2001) (EC-Asbestos);
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less inconsistent alternative measure, which the state could reasonably be
expected to employ, is available. A measure will not be reasonably available
where it is merely theoretical, where the responding state is not capable of taking
it, where the measure imposes an undue burden such as prohibitive costs or
substantial technical difficulties, or where the measure did not achieve the state's
chosen level of protection against the harm pursued by its regulatory objective. 93
Measures that are highly restrictive of trade may be found to be necessary where
no other less trade restrictive alternative is reasonably available. "
Having set out its approach to necessity, the Tribunal emphasized that it
was "not called upon to make any political or economic judgment on
Argentina's policies and of the measures adopted to pursue them," and that the
"evaluation of necessity does not require nor allow the Tribunal to go into the
merits in detail and to substitute its own judgment to that of the national
authorities." 9' Further, it remarked that "a margin of discretion and
appreciation" should be afforded to authorities to determine the necessity of a
measure.96 Rather, its role was "to evaluate only if... Argentina had no other
reasonable choices available ...than to adopt these Measures." 97

93
94

95

96

97

Reports of the Appellate Body, US-Gambling at
306 (cited in note 33); World Trade
Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Dominican Republic-MeasuresAffecting the Importation
and Internal Sale of Cigarettes 70, WTO Doc No WT/DS302/AB/R (Apr 25, 2005) (DRCigarettes).
Continental Casualy v Argentina, 1CSID Case No ARB/03/09 at 195, citing Report of the
Appellate Body, US-Gambling at 308 (cited in note 92).
Continental Casualo v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/09 at
195, citing World Trade
Organization, Report of the Panel, Brazil-MeasuresAffectingImports of Retreaded7res 7.211, WTO
Doc No WT/DS332/R (June 12, 2007) (Brafl-7jyres 1) (subsequently affirmed, after the
Continental Casualy decision, in World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, BrazilMeasuresAffectivg lmports of RetreadedTres 154, WTO Doc No WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec 3, 2007)
( #Bra/zl
-1res II)) .
Continental Casualy vArgentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/09 at
198-99, 233, n 351. It later
stated at 234: "Arguably, under Art. XI a Contracting Party may invoke necessity even if the
need to protect its essential security interest has materialized as a consequence of a deliberate but
still legitimate policy of that very State."
Continental Casualo v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/09 at 233 (cited in note 66). The
margin of appreciation is a doctrine of deference developed by the ECtHR in order to
accommodate uniform application of the ECHR and national views concerning reasonable
limitations on human rights, on the basis that the ECHR is an international treaty and that the
ECtHR's power to review decisions of national authorities should be more limited than those of a
national constitutional or other court reviewing such decisions. The margin has also been usedeither explicitly or by the adoption of methodology consistent with doctrine-by other courts and
tribunals including the ICJ, the CJEU, WTO panels and the Appellate Body and investment
tribunals.
Id at 199.
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Following WTO case law, the Tribunal stated that any alternative measures
would, in order to be reasonably available, have to "have yielded equivalent
results/relief' and that it was required to determine whether the measures
"contributed materially to the realization of their legitimate aims"-in particular,
whether the measures "were apt to and did make such a material or a decisive
contribution" to the objective of protecting Argentina's essential security
interests in the context of the crisis.98 Applying this methodology, the Tribunal
found that all but one of the measures99 were "in part indispensable and in any
case material or decisive in order to. . . prevent the complete break-down of the
financial system, the implosion of the economy and the growing threat to the
fabric of Argentinean society and generally to assist in overcoming the crisis.""
With regard to the devaluation of the peso, the Tribunal held that the alternative
measures proposed by the investor were "ineffective" (implicitly finding that
alternative measures must achieve the same level of benefit as the impugned
measure) and "impractical" and could not "have been reasonably pursued by
Argentina with any probable chances of success."'' 1 In relation to the
pesification of the US dollar-denominated contracts and deposits, it held that the
measures were "inevitable,"'0 2 and the suspension of payments and the default
and rescheduling of government financial instruments were "reasonably
necessary" and "appropriate and reasonable.""1 3 The Tribunal was explicitly
deferential with respect to necessity, in stating that it would not substitute its
judgment for Argentina's, but rather would determine whether Argentina had
other reasonable alternatives in the circumstances."°
However, the ConlinentalTribunal did not properly articulate the reasons
for its comparative approach, nor did it comprehensively represent how the
necessity test operates in the context of GATT Article XX and GATS Article
XIV. While referring to weighing and balancing and the WTO's approach, the

98

Id at M 196, 198.

99

100

It found that the restructuring of treasury bills did not meet the test of necessity without
consideration of reasonable alternatives: at the time the measures were put in place, the crisis had
waned (and the measures appeared to be unreasonable in that they required the investor to waive
other rights, including the protection of the investment treaty). This finding as to the absence of
circumstances engaging the need to protect the state's essential security interests logically
precludes necessity analysis.
Id at 196. In the Tribunal's view, there was undoubtedly "a genuine relationship of end and

101

means in this respect." Id at 1197.
ContinentalCasualy vArgentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/09 at IM 208-10 (cited in note 66).

102

Id at

103

Id at

104

214.

1 205, 210, 213, 219. Unlike the LG&E Tribunal, it did not stipulate a temporal limit on
the lawfulness of these measures.
ContinentalCasualo vArgenlina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/09 at 233, n 351.
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Tribunal did not undertake any balancing by explicit consideration of whether
the measures' effectiveness outweighed their impact on the investment. Nor did
it explicitly refer to the importance of the measures' objective. 5
At the time of writing, no subsequent tribunal has directly considered the
question of necessity under Article XI, and to date only one tribunal has
considered Article XI subsequently.0 6 However, a large number of cases are
pending against Argentina in relation to these measures, and it remains to be
seen whether this approach will find favor with other tribunals. 07
C. Fair and Equitable Treatment:
to Necessity

An Inconsistent Approach

Fair and equitable treatment requires that foreign investors are afforded a
minimum level of treatment, regardless of what their domestic counterparts
enjoy. The obligation imposes procedural and substantive obligations on
governments in relation to decisionmaking affecting investments. While the
textual manifestation of the obligation of fair and equitable treatment varies
across investment treaties, there is nevertheless considerable uniformity among
treaty provisions, and investment tribunal decisions on fair and equitable
treatment have increasingly converged around a number of sub-elements or
principles.0 8 These principles include the maintenance of a stable and
105 Although elsewhere in the decision it referred to Article Xl's purpose: "to protect national

106

interests of a paramount importance" ContinentalCasualyvArgenlina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/09
at 168 (cited in note 66).
El Paso v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/15 at
649-70 (holding that Argentina's

107

contribution to the economic crisis precluded its successful invocation of Article XI) (cited in
note 65).
See the list of pending cases at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?request

Type= GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending (visited May 3, 2013).
108 For example, some treaties expressly link fair and equitable treatment to customary international
law or to principles of international law, whereas some refer only to fair and equitable treatment
or contain text that expands upon the minimum standard. See, for example, NAFTA, Art 1105
(Minimum Standard of Treatment) (cited in note 60) ("1. Each Party shall accord to investments
of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and
equitable treatment'), compare with Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments,
Sweden-Czech
Republic,
Art
2(1)
(Oct 22,
1992),
online
at
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/sweden-czechoslovakia.pdf (visited Apr 13, 2013)
(stating that "[e]ach Contracting Party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable treatment of the
investments by investors of the other Contracting Party"). See, for example, Roland Kliger, Fair
and Equitable TreatmentinIlnternationalInvestmentLaw 85-87, 117-18 (Cambridge 2011); UNCTAD,
InternationalInvestment Agreements: Ke Issues Volume 1 *19 (United Nations 2004), online at
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiit200410_en.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2013). See, in relation to the
principles of fair and equitable treatment, Christoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in
Arbitral Practice, 6 J World Inv & Trade 357, 373-85 (2005); Todd Grierson-Weiler and Ian A.
Laird, Standards of Treatment, in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino, and Christoph Schreuer, eds,
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predictable regulatory environment in terms of the enactment of new laws
affecting investors, an obligation which is frequently characterized in terms of
the investor's legitimate expectations."' They also include legitimate
expectations arising from inconsistent administrative conduct, such as where a
state revokes a permit or reneges from previous commitments." The principle
of fair and equitable treatment also includes: procedural due process by
administrators"' and in judicial proceedings; 2 acting in good faith;" 3 protection
from arbitrary and discriminatory conduct" 4 and freedom from harassment and
coercion."'1
Tribunals have employed necessity analysis in fair and equitable cases
where investors have alleged that changes to laws and regulations have infringed
their legitimate expectations or are otherwise alleged to be unreasonable. In this
respect, necessity analysis is used to delimit lawful from unlawful measures
within the context of the primary obligation itself, rather than controlling an
exception to the rule. Tribunals do not appear to have used necessity analysis in

109

The O.xford Handbook of lnternationallnvestmentLaw 258,272-90 (Oxford 2008) ;Benedict Kingsbury
and Stephan Schill, Investor-State Arbitrationas Governance:FairandEquitable Treatment, Proportionaliy,
and the EmergingGlobalAdministraiveLaw, inAlbert Jan Van Den Berg, ed, 50 Years of the New York
Convention 5, 16 (Aspen 2009); Stephan Schill, The Multilaterali!Zationof lnternationallnvestmentLaw
79-80 (Cambridge 2009).
See, for example, CMS v. Argentina (Award), ICSID Case No ARB/O1 /8 at IM277-81; LG&E v.

110

Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/1 at IN 132-39; Enron v Argentina, ICSID Case No
260-68; Sempra vArgentina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/16 at I} 300-04; BG v
ARB/01/3 at
Argentina, Final Award at 256 (each cited in note 63).
See, for example, Tecmed vMexico, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/2 at 145 (cited in note 21).

"'

112

Waste Management,Inc v UnitedMexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/3, (Award of Apr 30,
98, online at http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/Waste/WasteFinalAward
2004)
Merits.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2013) (Waste Management vMexico); SD Myers, Inc v Government of Canada,
134 (UNCITRAL 2004); International ThunderbirdGaming Corporation v Mexico,
Partial Award,
Award, 200 (UNCITRAL 2006).
For example Compalia de Aguas delAconquija SA and Vivendi Universal vArgentine Republic, ICSID
80, online at https://icsid.worldbank.org/
Case No ARB/97/3, (Award of Nov 21, 2000)
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesR H&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC548_En&caseld
=C159 (visited Apr 14, 2013); The Loewen Group and Raymond L. Loewen v United States of America,
ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/98/3, (Award of June 26, 2003) 132, online at http://www.state.
gov/documents/organization/22094.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2013).

113

For example, Waste Management vMexico, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/3 at
111).

"4

For example, Eureko BV v Republic of Poland, ad hoc arbitration, (Partial Award of Aug 19, 2005)
232, online at http://italaw.com/sites/default/fdes/case-documents/itaO3O8_-O.pdf (visited Apr
14, 2013); Eureko B V v Republic of Poland,ad hoc arbitration, Dissenting Opinion (Aug 19, 2005),
online at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itaO3O7_O.pdf (visited Apr 14,
2013).
For example, Pope & Talbot, Inc v the Government of Canada, Award on Merit, 181 (UNCITRAL

115

138 (cited in note

2000) (Pope & Talbot v Canada); 1ecmed v Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)00/2 at

163.
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relation to other elements of fair and equitable treatment, such as the
requirement of procedural due process, non-discrimination and freedom from
harassment and coercion. This is most likely because conduct violating these
requirements is not usually taken with a legitimate objective, which is a
prerequisite for necessity analysis."1 6 Yet to date, tribunals have also declined to
employ necessity analysis in areas that might be amenable to such an approach,
such as consistency in administrative conduct. There is no reason why necessity
analysis is not an appropriate way to determine whether it is permissible for a
state to, for example, resile from previous representations or decisions with
respect to administrative decisionmaking. It should also be noted that tribunals
have employed or discussed other methods of analysis in assessing the stability
of laws and consistency of government conduct, such as assessing a measure's
reasonableness," 7 balancing the interests of the investor and the host state, 1 8 or
using the existence of a legitimate regulatory objective to determine the
measure's legality." 9

116

117

118

119

But see, Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co SA vArab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No
ARB/99/6, (Award of Apr 12, 2002)
143, online at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC595_En&casejd=C1 82
(visited Apr 14, 2013), described by Kingsbury and Schill, Public Law Concepts at 97-98 (cited in
note 89) as implicitly employing a form of proportionality analysis (including necessity) with
respect to procedural due process.
See, for example, Merrill 6- Ring v Canada, Award, 213 (UNCITRAL 2010).; MCI Power Group
LCandNew Turbine, Inc v Republic ofEcuador, ICSID Case No ARB/03/6, (Award ofJuly 31, 2007)
278, online at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itaO5OO.pdf (visited Apr
14,2013); Parkerings-CompagnietASvRepublic of Lithuania,ICSID Case No ARB/05/8, (Award of
Sept 11, 2007) 332, online at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC682_En&caseld=C252 (visited Apr 14, 2013); El
Paso v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/15 at 402 (cited in note 65); Saluka v Czech Republic,
Partial Award at 307 (cited in note 21); Impreglio vArgentina, ICSID Case No ARB/07/17 at
291 (cited in note 66).
See, for example, Saluka v Czech Republic, Partial Award at
304-07; EDF (Services) Limitedv
Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/13, (Award of Oct 8, 2009) In 45-64, online at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal =showDoc&docld=DC1 215_En&caseld= C57
(visited Apr 14, 2013) (EDFv Romania); Glamis GoldLtd v UnitedStates of America, Award 762,
779, 803-05 (UNCITRAL 2009) (Glamir Goldv US); Total vArgentina, ICSID Case No ARB/04/1
at
123, 162-65, 309 (cited in note 21).
See, for example, Metalclad Corporationv United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/97/1,
(Award
of
Aug
30,
2000)
in
90-99,
online
at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc
&docld=DC542_En&caseId=C155 (visited Apr 14, 2013) (Metalclad v Mexico); Tecmed v Mexico,
ICSID Case No ARB(AF)00/2 at
157,173 (citedin note 21);AlexGenin, Eastern CreditLimited,
Inc and AS Baltoil v Estonia, ICISD Case No ARB/99/2, (Award of June 25, 2001) In 364-65,
online at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal
=showDoc&docId=DC592_En&caseld=C178 (visited Apr 14, 2013) (Genin v Estonia).
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The Pope and Talbot v CanadaTribunal employed a deferential approach to
the question of necessity, indicating that host states should have the scope to
select a measure within certain boundaries. The matter concerned a number of
regulatory measures taken to implement the Canada-US Softwood Lumber
Agreement, including (1) a super fee (a fee applied to certain exports of
softwood lumber to the US) imposed on some producers, including the investor,
for a benefit accorded to all producers in a particular province and (2) a
transitional adjustment quota which had the effect of disadvantaging a group of
producers, including the investor. 2 In relation to these measures the Tribunal
held, respectively, that Canada's approach was a "reasonable response"; and that
while Canada might have selected an alternative measure, the Tribunal would
not substitute its judgment for that of authorities, suggesting that it would not
interfere with a choice of measure unless that choice reached a certain level of
severity compared with other potential measures.12 The Tribunal appeared
cognizant of its limitations in determining the likely efficacy and impact on
investors of alternative measures. However, the Tribunal did not use this form
of analysis in relation to the other claims, including where the Tribunal found a
breach of fair and equitable treatment. 1" This may have been due to the
Tribunal's reluctance to generate and evaluate alternative measures where there
is uncertainty as to their likely efficacy.
Other decisions display a stricter approach to necessity. The cases of Suez
and InterAgua v Agenlina (InterAgua) 2 and Suet, Vivendi and AWG v Argenlina
(AWG)'24 both concerned suppliers of drinking water and sewerage services
pursuant to concession agreements with municipal authorities. The suppliers
alleged that Argentine provincial authorities breached fair and equitable
treatment by a number of actions, including the enactment of decrees directing
authorities not to adjust tariffs for drinking water and sewerage services in the
context of the economic crisis, even after Argentina's economic crisis had
abated." Both tribunals, in almost identically worded decisions, undertook
necessity analysis to find that the province had alternative measures available
that would have had less impact on the claimants' interests, such as "tariff
increases for other consumers while applying a social tariff or a subsidy to the

120
121

Pope & Talbot v Canada, Award on Merits at IM153-56; 122-23 (cited in note 115).
Id at I 123, 128, 155.

123

In relation to an audit of an investor's records after it had filed the notice of arbitration, the
172-73.
Tribunal held that Canada failed to justify the reason for its actions. Id at
InterAgua vArgentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/17 (cited in note 66).

124

AWG vArgentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/19 (cited in note 66).

125

Id at I 238,243,247-48; InterAguavArgentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/17 at IM 218,223, 227-

122

28.
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poor."'' 6 While the regulatory framework permitted the setting of tariff levels to
take account of social objectives (and required that the investor be
compensated), these decisions are open to the criticism that the tribunals did not
give due consideration to whether, in the circumstances of the crisis, authorities
possessed the capacity to devise and implement a differential tariff or subsidy
scheme. Although appearing to accept the legitimacy of the authorities' objective
(ensuring access of the population to the water supply), both tribunals ultimately
held that the provincial measures amounted to an "abuse of regulatory
discretion" and fell outside the scope of Argentina's legitimate right to
regulate. 127
In his separate opinions rendered in the cases, Arbitrator Pedro Nikken
opined that a tribunal should not undertake necessity analysis strictly; rather, the
role of a tribunal was to determine whether a measure was "within the range of
decisions that any reasonable government could have adopted under the same
circumstances. ' 128 This statement suggests that a more restrained approach to
necessity is apposite, at least in the context of an economic crisis.1 29 Nikken's
statements also evidence concern with tribunals' competence to evaluate
alternative measures, particularly in the context of economic policy and crisis
situations, where tribunals are particularly weak in their ability to obtain all
relevant information and predict the consequences of interventions.
Finally, the Glamis Gold v US Tribunal undertook a procedural approach to
necessity analysis in finding that measures were not in breach of fair and
equitable treatment. The claim concerned a challenge under NAFTA's
investment chapter to new state laws designed to address environmental and
cultural concerns associated with mining, as well as challenges to delays by
federal authorities in issuing a permit to operate a mining site. The new
legislation required operators to backfill open pit metal mines in certain
circumstances, and placed greater regulatory controls on mining sites where
indigenous artifacts were uncovered. Reviewing the legislation, the Tribunal took

126

InterAgua vArgentina, ICSlD Case No ARB/03/17 at 1 215; AWG v/Argentina, ICSID Case No

127

ARB/03/19 at 235.
InterAgua vArgentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/17 at

128

129

217; AWG vArgentina, ICSID Case No

ARB/03/19 at 237.
InterAgua v A rgentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/17, Separate Opinion of Professor Nikken (July
30, 2010) I 37, 42, online at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita08l4.pdf (Apr 14, 2013); AWG vArgentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/19, Separate Opinion of
Professor Nikken (July 30, 2010)
37, 42, online at http://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/ita0827.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2013).
InterAgua v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/04/17, Separate Opinion of Professor Nikken at IN
37, 42-43; AWC v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/19, Separate Opinion of Professor
Nikken at M 37, 42-43.

Summer 2013

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

a deferential approach to the questions of legitimate objective, suitability and
necessity. The Tribunal did not undertake strict scrutiny of the importance of
the measures' objective, stating that the relevant test was "whether or not there
was a manifest lack of reasons for the legislation."'" With respect to the
measures' suitability, the Tribunal referred to the authorities' "sufficient good
faith belief that there was a reasonable connection between the harm and the
proposed remedy," and found the legislation "reasonably drafted to address its
objectives" and "rationally related to its stated purpose."'' While the Tribunal
did not explicitly undertake least restrictive means testing, it referred in its
decision to similar processes undertaken by the authorities. Authorities
promulgating the new regulations had considered alternative measures, and the
Tribunal noted their finding that the option selected was "necessary for the
immediate preservation of the public general welfare."' 3 2 The Tribunal appeared
to suggest that where a state could demonstrate that it actively considered
alternative measures, the Tribunal might give more leeway with respect to this
stage of analysis. This approach limits substantive review of the actual
alternatives, but places a greater burden on authorities with respect to their
decisionmaking processes.'33
D. Indirect Expropriation:
Analysis

No Clear Trend of Necessity

Customary international law (as reflected in most investment treaties)
provides that an expropriation will be lawful provided that it is effectuated for a
public purpose, is not arbitrary or discriminatory in its effect, follows principles

803, 805 (cited in note 118).

130

Glamis v US, Award at

131

Id at IM803, 805.
Id at
180. Relevant regulatory schemes also required that, when determining whether to

132

authorize an entity to take action that had the potential to affect the environment, authorities
consider feasible alternatives and select a preferred alternative in terms of environmental impact
and other factors, including economic, social and technical matters. Id at M63-64, 70, 101. The
tribunal also went on to consider the whether the legislation represented a fair balance between
the competing interests, holding that generally, it would respect the legislature's attempt to
achieve an appropriate balance of interests where it was apparent that those interests had been
taken into account. Id at 625-26, 726, 803-04. See also Methanex v United States, Award, Part
III, Chapter A IM 13, 15 (UNCITRAL 2005), where the Tribunal referred to cost-benefit analysis
performed in relation to the banned substance and alternative fuel oxygenates, as well as expert
evidence with respect to a phase-out of the substance rather than a ban; and Chemtura Corporation
v. GovernmentofCanada,UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Award, August 2, 2010 IM 181-82, 192, where the
Tribunal referred to an alternative measure proposed by the investor (a phase-out rather than a
ban of a toxic pesticide), but found that that this option had been offered to the investor and the
investor had refused.
33

See Andenas and Zleptnig, 42 Tex Intl LJ at 415 (cited in note 29).
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of due process, and is properly compensated." 3 While the scope of direct
expropriation is relatively uncontroversial, there is uncertainty regarding the
distinction between indirect expropriation and non-compensable regulations or
other measures, and the role of the impugned measure in this assessment. The
police powers doctrine recognizes host states' right to regulate or take other
measures significantly affecting foreign investors' property interests without a
finding of expropriation where such measures fall within the ambit of the state's
general regulatory or administrative powers, pursue a legitimate purpose, are
aimed at the general welfare, and are non-discriminatory.135 Several recent
decisions have adopted an approach to determining indirect expropriation claims
which takes both the purpose and effect of host state measures into
consideration, though the extent to which the state's regulatory purpose may be
taken into account in determining whether there has been an expropriation is
largely unsettled. Like fair and equitable treatment, tribunals considering indirect
expropriation claims have used, or adverted to, other forms of analysis such as
reasonableness136 and balancing the interests of the investor and the host state. 37
Necessity considerations may also play a role in defining when a measure
will amount to an expropriation. Although there do not appear to be any
decided cases in which a tribunal decided the question of expropriation based on
least restrictive means analysis, tribunals have referred to necessity as a relevant
legal test (or component thereof). The SD Myers Tribunal (referred to below)
stated that both the purpose and the effect of the measure should be taken into
account in determining whether an expropriation occurred, and remarked
elsewhere in its decision that authorities were required to select a measure that
had the least restrictive effect on foreign investment."13 It may be inferred that
the Tribunal would have applied these considerations to its determination of
expropriation had the effect on the investment been sufficiently intense to
134

135

136

137

138

See, for example, Malcolm N. Shaw, InternationalLaw 829-37 (Cambridge 6th ed 2008); Schill,
MultilateraliZation at 81 (cited in note 108); Kingsbury and Schill, Investor-State Arbitraion as
Governance, in Van Den Berg, ed, 50 Years at 31 (cited in note 108).
See, for example, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Expropriation:A Sequel,
UNCAD Series on Issues in InternationalInvestment Agreements II, 78-79 (United Nations 2012),
online at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011 d7_en.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2013).
Marvin Rey Feldman v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/99/1, (Award of Dec 16,
2002) M 103-05, online at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC587_En&caseld=C175
(visited Apr 14, 2013)
(Feldman v Mexico).
For example, Tecmed v Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/2 at
117-19, 121-22 (cited in
note 21) (without undertaking necessity testing). See Caroline Henckels, IndirectExropriationand
the R'ght to Regulate: Revisiting Proportionaliy Analysis and the Standard of Review in Investor-State
Arbitration, 15 J Intl Econ L 223 (2012).
SD Myers v Canada, Partial Award at IM215, 221, 255, 281-82.
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require consideration of the measure's purpose. Only the Archer Daniels Tribunal
has specifically mentioned the concept of necessity in the context of indirect
expropriation, referring in passing to a requirement that a measure be
' Other
"proportionate or necessary for a legitimate purpose."139
tribunals have
referred to the concept of proportionality in this assessment, which may mean
that they would analyze a measure's necessity as part of this approach. However,
these tribunals found that the level of interference with the investment was not
sufficient to ground an expropriation claim, and did not go on to consider the
proportionality of the challenged measure."
E. National Treatment
The national treatment obligation requires that host states treat foreign
investors no less favorably than domestic investors in like circumstances. The
majority of decided cases suggest that host states may defend treatment that
would otherwise be in breach of national treatment where the action is taken in
pursuit of a legitimate public policy objective. Tribunals have, in most cases,
used the existence of a legitimate objective rationally connected to the measure
as the basis for finding that the foreign investor and its domestic counterpart
were not in like circumstances, or that the differential treatment of investors in
like circumstances may nevertheless be justified. 4' Most investment tribunals
have not adopted a necessity test for this purpose. However, the Tribunal in SD
Myers required that measures differentiating between foreign and domestic
investors to satisfy a least restrictive means test. 142
139

Archer Daniels vMexico, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/04/5 at

250 (emphasis added) (cited in note

141

4).
AZurix Corporationv the Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/12, Award (July 14, 2006)
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
at
online
% 310-12,
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC507_En&caseld=C5 (visited Apr 14, 2013); Firemans
FundInsurance Company v UnitedMexicanStates, ARB (AF) /02/1, (Award ofJuly 17, 2003) 176(j),
=
t
=
online at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType CasesRH&ac ionVal
showDoc&docld=DC624_En&caseld=C207 (visited Apr 14, 2013); Continental Casualy v
Argentina, ICS1D Case No ARB/03/09 at 276 (cited in note 66); lnterAgua vArgentina, ICSID
147-48 (cited in note 66); Total v Argentina, ICSID Case No
Case No ARB/03/17 at
ARB/04/1 at 7 197 (cited in note 21); El Paso vArgentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/15 at 241
(cited in note 65).
For example, FeldmanvMexico, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/99/1 at7 7170,184 (cited in note 136);

142

78, 81 (cited in note 115); GAMI Investments, Inc v
Pope & Talbot v Canada, Award on Merits at
Mexico, Final Award, 7 114 (UNCITRAL 2004). See DiMascio and Pauwelyn, 102 AmJ Intl L at
76, 87-88 (cited in note 3); Federico Ortino, Non-DiscriminatoryTreatment in Investment Disputes, in
Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Francisco Francioni, and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, eds Human Rights in
InternationalInvestment Law andArbitration 344, 361-63 (Oxford 2009).
SD Myers v Canada, Partial Award at 7 250, 255. See also the inter-state NAFTA case, United
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States-In the Matter of Cross Border Trucking Services, (Award of Feb 6, 2001)

258, online at
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In SD Myers v Canada, the government enacted legislation banning the
export of a toxic substance (PCB) from its territory, requiring disposal to take
place within Canada with the effect that the investor, a US-based disposal
provider, was no longer able to export PCB for disposal within the US."'
Canada argued that its actions were necessary for environmental reasons, but the
Tribunal found that the law's true objective was to assist domestic industries. 44
Accepting for the sake of argument that the measure had an "indirect
environmental objective," the Tribunal found that the measure was not
necessary to achieve this objective, as it could have been achieved by other
equally effective means, such as by giving the domestic industry preferential
treatment through subsidies or with respect to government procurement-both
of which are specifically permitted in NAFTA's investment chapter.14 ' The
Tribunal also offered some general remarks that a government enacting
measures directed at environmental protection was required to select a measure
that was the least restrictive of investment. It held that "where a state can
achieve its chosen level of environmental protection through a variety of equally
effective and reasonable means, it is obliged to adopt the alternative that is most
consistent with open trade. This corollary also is consistent with the language
and the case law arising out of the WTO family of agreements."'" In this
respect, the Tribunal referred to the requirement in WTO case law that
alternative measures must achieve the same level of protection desired by the
state.'47 Yet, while the Tribunal suggested that these alternative measures would
be as effective as the ban, it did not appear to explore the feasibility and lessrestrictive nature of these options.'4 8 This might be explained by the fact that the

143

http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/USTrucking/USTruckingChapter20.pdf
Mar 11, 2013).
SD Myers v Canada, Partial Award at IM123-26.

144 Id at
145

146
147

148

(visited

162-95.

Id at In 195,255; NAFTA, Art 1108(7). While this analysis was in relation to national treatment,
the Tribunal relied on it in finding that Canada had breached the fair and equitable treatment
requirement.
SD Myers v Canada, Partial Award at In 215, 221.
The Tribunal justified its approach to using WTO jurisprudence in stating that, like the WTO
agreements, NAFTA's chapters formed a "single undertaking" meaning that, in its view, there was
no reason not to apply the provisions of Chapter 3 (trade in goods) to the investment chapter, in
particular Article 315, which states that parties may adopt or maintain export restrictions
consistent with GATT Article XX(g), (i) or (j) in certain circumstances. SD/Myers v Canada, Partial
Award at 292.
See Klhiger, Fair and Equitable Treatment at 241 (cited in note 108). In relation to similar criticism
leveled at pre-WTO GATT panels, see, for example, John 0. McGinnis and Mark L. Movsesian,
The World Trade Constitution, 114 Harv L Rev 511, 579-80 (2000); Michael Ming Du, Autonomyin
Selling Appropriate Level of Protection under the W1K10 Lav: Rhetoric or Realiy?, 13 J Intl Econ L 1077,
1091 (2010).
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Tribunal's decision predates Korea-Beefand subsequent WTO jurisprudence with
respect to necessity testing.
It is also arguable that in UPS v Canada, the Tribunal undertook a
procedural approach to necessity testing, referring to Canada's arguments that
authorities had considered alternatives and accepting that the measure was "the
most efficient means" of achieving the objective, although the reasoningwas not
further developed in relation to this issue.'49
IV. THE USE OF NECESSITY ANALYSIS IN WTO CASE LAW
A. The General Exceptions in GATT Article XX and GATS
Article XIV
1. Overview.
The concept of necessity appears numerous times throughout the WTO
Agreements.' However, the necessity provisions that have received the most
attention from WTO tribunals are the general exceptions in Article XX of
GATT and Article XIV of GATS. The Appellate Body has developed a detailed
test to determine whether a measure is "necessary" within the meaning of these
provisions. In essence, the test has three stages. First, the measure must have an
objective that is recognized by one of the exceptions. Second, the tribunal must
weigh the degree to which the measure achieves its objective against the degree
149

150

UnitedParcelServiceofAmericalnc v Government of Canada, Award on the Merits, 165 (UNOTRAL
2007). However, in this case, Arbitrator Ronald Cass rejected a least-restrictive means approach to
national treatment:
The position urged by UPS on this point would have the Tribunal read Article
1102 to provide narrowly limited scope for government to follow policy
objectives that have the effect of disadvantaging foreign investors or
investments. That construction would severely constrain NAFTA Parties in
pursuit of their own objectives and would greatly expand the power of
NAFTA tribunals to evaluate the legitimacy of government objectives and
efficacy of governmentally chosen means.
Separate Statement of Arbitrator Cass IM113, 117.
See, for example GATT, Arts 1I:3, VII:3, XI:2(b) and (c), XII:2(a), XVIII:9, XIX, XX(a), (b), (d)
and (i), and XXI(b) (cited in note 15); SPS Agreement, Arts 2.1, 2.2 and 5.6 (cited in note 17);
TBT Agreement, Art 2.2, 12.3 and 12.7 (cited in note 15); Agreement on Safeguards, Art 5.1,
Final Act Embodying the Results of Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal
Instruments-Results of Uruguay Round vol 1, 33 ILM 1125 (1945); Agreement on Government
Procurement, Art XXIII, Final Act Embodying the Results of Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments-Results of Uruguay Round vol 1, Annex 4(b) 33 ILM
1125; GATS, Arts X1I:2(d), XIV(a), (b) and (c), and XIV bis:1(b) (cited in note 17); and
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Arts 8.1, 27.2, 39.3
and 73(b), Final Act Embodying the Results of Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Legal Instruments-Results of Uruguay Round vol 1, Annex 1C (1994), 1869 UN
Treaty Ser 299 (1995).
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to which it restricts international trade, and must do so in light of the
importance of the objective. Third, if the second step leads to a preliminary
conclusion that the measure is "necessary," the tribunal must consider whether a
less trade-restrictive measure is reasonably available to achieve the same
objective. These three inquiries can be described as the "objective," "suitability"
and "least restrictive means" stages of the test.' The "objective" inquiry is
usually a relatively straightforward question of fact." 2 The tribunal determines
the objective of the measure and whether it falls within one of the exceptions by
examining its text, design and regulatory context,5 3 as well as statements of
lawmakers and officials. 1" The "suitability" and "least restrictive means"
inquiries raise a more complex set of issues.
2. Suitability.
The Appellate Body first promulgated a suitability test, or "weighing and
balancing" test, as part of its necessity analysis in Korea-Beef In that case, Korea
claimed that a requirement that domestic and imported beef be sold in separate
stores was necessary to prevent retailers from fraudulently labeling imported
beef as domestic.' Korea relied on GATT Article XX(d), which applies to
measures "necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not
inconsistent with" GATT, including measures relating to "the prevention of
deceptive practices.' 5 6
The Appellate Body noted that a wide range of measures could be "laws
and regulations" within the meaning of Article XX(d) and that such measures
could pursue many different objectives. In light of this, it held that WTO
tribunals could "in appropriate cases, take into account the relative importance
of the common interests or values that the law or regulation" is intended to
protect because "[t]he more vital or important those common interests or values
are, the easier it would be to accept as 'necessary' a measure designed as an

152

We adopt this terminology so that the stages of the investment law and WTO law necessity tests
are described consistently in this article. These terms are not necessarily used by WTO tribunals
themselves.
However, difficult interpretive questions may arise about the scope of the exceptions themselves.

153

The scope of "public morals" is one example. See Reports of the Appellate Body, US-Gamblingat
6.461 (cited in note 33).
World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Japan-laxeson Alcoholic Beverages 26,

1s4

WTO Doc Nos WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct 4,1996); World
Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Australia-MeasuresAffecting the Importation of
Apples from New Zealand, WTO Doc No WT/DS367/AB/R (Nov 29, 2010) 173 (AustraliaApples).
See, for example Report of the Panel, US-Gambling at M 6.481-6.487.

155

Report of the Appellate Body, Korea-Beefat M25-26 (cited in note 90).

156

GATT Art. XX(d) (cited in note 2).

151
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enforcement instrument."'5 7 Further, the Appellate Body held that it would be
easier to accept that a measure was "necessary" the more it contributed to its
objective and the less it restricted international trade.5 8
According to the framework set out by the Appellate Body, the role of a
tribunal is to determine where the measure falls on sliding scales of importance,
contribution, and trade-restrictiveness; then, "weighing and balancing" the
results of those inquiries to determine whether a measure is "necessary."'5 9
However, instead of applying these steps, the Appellate Body cryptically stated
that this framework was "encapsulate [d]" by the least-restrictive measure test
that had previously been applied by panels under the GATT 1947. 60 It therefore
applied a least restrictive measure test without actually determining or weighing
1
the importance, contribution and trade-restrictiveness of Korea's measure. 61
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of Korea-Beef was the Appellate
Body's finding that WTO tribunals can assess the importance of the objective
pursued by the respondent's measure. On one view, this arrogates too much
discretionary power to a tribunal and undermines the right of the responding
state to determine its own level of protection against the problem to which the
measure is directed. 162 Moreover, there is no obvious reason to find that one
objective falling within Article XX is more or less important than another,
particularly as the objective of preventing "deceptive practices" (at issue in
has therefore been
Korea-Bee) is actually mentioned in Article XX(d) and
63
recognized as important by WTO Members themselves.
When Korea-Beef was decided in 2000, three considerations appeared to
attenuate these concerns. First, the Appellate Body implied that this inquiry was
restricted to Article XX(d), because among the general exceptions only that
provision is open-ended in terms of the policy objectives it covers." 6' Second,
the Appellate Body did not explicitly assess the importance of Korea's objective,
157

Report of the Appellate Body, Korea-Beefat

158

Id at

162 (cited in note 90).

163.

159 Idat 164.
160
Id at N 165-66.
161

Donald H. Regan, The Meaningof 'Necessary"inGA7L'TArticle XX and GATS Article XIV: The Myth

162

of Cost-Benefit Balancing, 6 World Trade Rev 347, 359-60 (2007).
See, for example, id at 366; Jan Neumann and Elisabeth Turk, Necessiy Revisited: Proportionaliyin

163

World Trade OrganizationLawAfter Korea-Beef,EC-AsbestosandEC-Sardines,37J World Trade 199,
232-33 (2003);Giselle Kapterian,A Critique ofthe Wf'TO Jurisprudenceon'Aecessioy," 59 Intl & Comp
L Q 89, 119 (2010); Du, 13J Intl Econ L at 1101 (cited in note 148).
See World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Import Prohibition of

164

Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 121, WTO Doc No WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct 12, 1998).
Benn McGrady, Necessity Exceptions in WIDO Law: Retreaded ijyres, Regulatory Purpose and Cumulative
Regulatog Measures, 12J Intl Econ L 153, 160-61 (2008).
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although it did reject Korea's stated level of protection of that objective.165
Korea claimed that its measure sought to achieve the total elimination of fraud.
However, while recognizing that "it is not open to doubt that Members of the
WTO have the right to determine for themselves the level of enforcement of
their VITO-consistent laws and regulations," the Appellate Body stated that it
thought it "unlikely" that Korea really intended to eliminate fraud and that in
fact its measure was designed only to considerably reduce it.
66 And third, one
reading of the "importance of the objective" factor is that tribunals apply a
margin of appreciation to this analysis, under which the other factors of
contribution and trade restrictiveness are considered.' 67 On this reading, the
more important the tribunal assesses the objective of the measure to be, the less
the measure will need to contribute to the objective and the more trade
restrictive it may be and still be found "necessary." Moreover, where the
Member's objective is of high importance, the tribunal may also exercise more
deference to the Member's choice of measure under the least restrictive means
analysis ("reasonable necessity").
In subsequent cases, however, the Appellate Body stated that the inquiry
into the importance of the objective should be undertaken with respect to each
of the necessity exceptions. For example, in EC-Asbestos, it held that the
protection of human life and health from carcinogenic asbestos products was
"vital and important in the highest degree,"'' 68 while in US-Gambling and ChinaAudiovisuals the panels held that measures for the protection of public morals
should also be regarded as very important. 69 Thus, the inquiry into the
importance of the objective is carried out even for objectives that are explicitly
mentioned in Article XX, although the case law strongly suggests that when an
objective fits within an explicit exception it will be held to be of high
importance.
On the other hand, the Appellate Body has also refined the suitability test
so that it is now clear that the importance of the measure is not directly weighed

165

See notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
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Report of the Appellate Body, Korea-Beef at

167

Regan, World Trade Rev at 352-53 (cited in note 161).

168

Report of the Appellate Body, EC-Asbestos at T 172 (cited in note 92).

176-78 (cited in note 90).

1 6.492 (cited in note 33); World Trade Organization, Report
of the Panel, China-MeasuresAffecting TradingRights and DistributionServicesfor CertainPublications and
Audiovisual Entertainment Products 7.817, WTO Doc No WT/DS363/R (Aug 12, 2009) (ChinaAudiovisuals). The Panel and Appellate Body also held in DR-Cigarettes that the protection of tax
revenues is a "most important interest" falling within Article XX(d). World Trade Organization,
Report of the Panel, Dominican Republic-MeasursAffectingthe ImportationandInternalSale of Cigarettes
7.215, WTO Doc No WT/DS302/R (Nov 26, 2004); Report of the Appellate Body, DRCigarettes at 71 (cited in note 92).

169 Report of the Panel, US-Gambling at
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against its trade restrictiveness. In Brazil-Tyres and China-Audiovisuals, the
Appellate Body clarified that it is the effectiveness and trade restrictiveness of a
measure that should be weighed and balanced, but that this should be done "in
the light" of the importance of its objective.17 ° Thus, importance appears to
operate, as some commentators had predicted it might, 71 as a margin of
appreciation under which the weighing of contribution and trade restrictiveness
takes place. Deference is afforded according to the importance of the regulatory
objective as a background to Appellate Body's weighing and balancing. Not only
is this likely to lead to greater deference, but it also serves to emphasize that the
suitability test is not a strict cost-benefit analysis (in the sense of quantifying the
costs and benefits of the measure), nor does it involve a balancing test by which
the tribunal attempts to balance the social benefits and detriments of the
measure. Instead, it is a process of weighing disparate values that cannot be
reduced to a common denominator. For example, the protection of "life or
health" or "public morals" cannot be quantified in absolute economic terms and
so cannot be directly compared with trade restrictiveness. Instead, the policy
value and the trade restriction are compared in broad terms and the importance
inquiry functions to tip the scales towards a finding that the measure is
"necessary." The test is open to criticism for being vague, but the analytical
process described by the Appellate Body also provides a relatively sophisticated
framework that seeks to incorporate all relevant factors into the analysis.
Another factor that assists in proving necessity (in terms of the suitability
criterion) is that the Appellate Body has held that the effectiveness of a measure
does not necessarily need to be shown by proving its actual contribution to the
objective. In cases where the measure is novel, or where it is part of a package of
interrelated measures aimed at achieving a particular policy goal, effectiveness
may also be demonstrated by showing with quantitative projections or
qualitative reasoning that the measure is "apt to produce a material contribution
to the achievement of its objective." 72 In BrazilTyres, the Appellate Body held
that an import ban aimed at protecting human life and health was "necessary"
under Article XX(b), even though the degree to which it achieved its objective
could not be demonstrated other than by showing that it was "apt" to achieve
the objective in the future, and even though an import ban is "by design as
trade-restrictive as can be."' 73 The Appellate Body has also remarked that the
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Report of the Appellate Body, Bra#l-Tyres at 156 (cited in note 94); World Trade Organization,
240-42, WTO Doc No WT/DS363/AB/R
Report of the Appellate Body, China-Audiovisuals
(Dec 21, 2009).

'71

Regan, World Trade Rev at 352-53 (cited in note 161).
Report of the Appellate Body, Bra#l-Tres at 151 (cited in note 94).

172

173 Id at

150, quoting Report of the Panel, Brazil-'yres at

7.211 (cited in note 94).
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effectiveness of a given measure may only be discernible with the passage of
time, and has given the benefit of the doubt to states with respect to predicting
measures' effectiveness at achieving their objectives.'74 Thus, WTO tribunals will
give respondents significant deference where their measure is one of a suite of
"mutually supportive elements of a comprehensive policy."' 75 This approach
may also apply more broadly: in the earlier case of Mexico-Soft Drinks, the
Appellate Body stated that the suitability requirement would be satisfied where a
measure is "capable" of achieving its objective or where "the measure cannot be
guaranteed to achieve its result with absolute certainty." ' 76 This deference
acknowledges the uncertainty inherent in promulgating regulations in terms of
whether a measure will actually realize its purpose.
Some commentators have criticized this approach for allowing measures
that are merely likely to make a contribution to their objective as "necessary,"
undermining the Appellate Body's earlier statement in Korea-Beef that
"necessary" means something closer to "indispensable."' 7 However, this
critique overlooks that the standard of "aptness" introduced by the Appellate
Body is only a threshold for the necessity test. If the measure is found to be
"apt," it must still pass the more rigorous suitability and least restrictive measure
analyses.' 78
The inquiry into the degree of "trade-restrictiveness" of a measure is
perhaps the least well understood of the three elements of the weighing and
balancing test. Under the GATT 1947, Panels equated trade-restrictiveness with
the degree to which the measure was inconsistent with the positive obligations
of the Agreement. 17 However, this raises difficult questions of how
inconsistency is to be measured and appears to overlook the underlying aims of
the GATT, by potentially requiring Members to adopt measures that are less
inconsistent in a legal sense but which may have a heavier impact on trade. 180
Although the Appellate Body approved the GATT Panels' approach in Korea174

World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, UnitedStates-Standardsfor Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline 21-22, WTO Doc No WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr 29, 1996) (US -Gasoline);
Report of the Appellate Body, Brazil- res at 151 (cited in note 94); DanielLovric, Deferenceto Ile
Legislature in WTO: Challenges to Legislation 148 (Aspen 2010).

175

Report of the Appellate Body, Brazl-'7jresat 211 (cited in note 94).
Report of the Appellate Body, Mexico-Soft Drinks at T 74 (cited in note 4).

176
177
178

Chad P. Bown and Joel P. Trachtman, Bra#I-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded 7jres: A
BalancingAct, 8 World Trade Rev 85, 126 (2009).
Benn McGrady, Trade and Public Health: The W O, Tobacco, Alcohol and Diet 148-49 (Cambridge
2010).

179

GAIT Panel Report, United States Section337 of the TariffActof 1930 5.26, GAIT BISD 36S/345
(Jan 16, 1989).
18) Neumann and Turk, 37 J World Trade at 207-08 (cited in note 162).
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Beef,' it equated trade-restrictiveness with the measure's factual impact on
imports.182 This finding, in the context of a violation of Article 111:4 (national
183
treatment), related specifically to restrictive effects on imported goods.
However, in China-Audiovisuals the Appellate Body clarified that the traderestrictiveness inquiry is not limited to the impact on imports but should be
carried out "in the light of the specific obligation of the covered agreements that
the

. . .

measure infringes."'"

In that case, the infringed obligations related not

only to "what can be traded, but more directly with the question of who is entitled
to engage in trading"; thus, the restriction on the right to trade was the most
relevant.

85

These cases show that the Appellate Body has moved away from defining
trade-restrictiveness as the "degree of inconsistency" and towards a
consideration of the factual impact of the measure on the underlying values that
the infringed obligation is designed to protect. This is a more fluid approach that
avoids both a simplistic focus on the quantity of imports and exports and the
impossibility of quantifying the "degree" of a legal violation. It may also allow
the Appellate Body to determine the trade-restrictiveness of a measure according
to amorphous values with little basis in the text of the Agreement (though there
is little evidence of this in the existing case law). In China-Audiovisuals, for
example, the Appellate Body derived the values in question from a careful
examination of China's Accession Protocol, which was at issue.
3. Least restrictive alternative measure.
If the weighing and balancing exercise leads to a preliminary conclusion
that the measure is "necessary," the next step undertaken by WTO tribunals is to
determine whether less trade-restrictive measures exist that would achieve the
Member's objective. Such measures are generally proposed by the complainant
and must be "reasonably available" to the respondent.'86 This means that the
respondent must be capable of taking them, they must not impose an "undue

181 Report of the Appellate Body, Korea-Beef at 166 (cited in note 90); see also Report of the
Appellate Body, EC-Asbestos at 171 (cited in note 92).
182
Report of the Appellate Body, Korea-Beef at 163 (cited in note 90).
183

The Appellate Body also noted that one of the stated objectives of the GATT is "the elimination

184

of discriminatory treatment in international commerce." Report of the Appellate Body, Korea-Beef
(cited in note 90).
Report of the Appellate Body, China-Audiovisuals at 306 (cited in note 170).

185

Idat

307.

186

Id at

319; Report of the Appellate Body, Bra#il-'Iyres at 156 (cited in note 94); Report of the

Appellate Body, US-Gambling at

5.26 (cited in note 33).
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burden" in the form of prohibitive costs or technical difficulties, and they must
meet the respondent's desired level of protection. 187
Because the clauses of Article XX and Article XJV are exceptions to the
primary obligations of the GATT and the GATS, the respondent bears the
burden of demonstrating that its measure meets their requirements, including
the necessity test. 88 However, in US-Gambling the Appellate Body clarified that
this does not mean that the respondent must positively exclude all potential
alternative measures; instead, it need only show that measures proposed by the
'
complainant are not "reasonably available."189
In part, this is because if the
respondent demonstrates to the Tribunal that its measure should be considered
"necessary" under the weighing and balancing test, the Tribunal will already have
come to a primafade conclusion that the measure meets the requirements of the
exception."19 However, this should not be taken to mean that the burden of
proof then switches to the complainant to show that a reasonable alternative
exists. Instead, the complainant need only propose a measure that "in its view,
the responding party should have taken";"' it is then for the respondent to show
that the measure is not reasonable. In China-Audiovisuals, the US proposed that
China's system for reviewing the content of imported media would be less traderestrictive if it were centralized in a single body. China asserted that this would
be unduly burdensome and costly, but did not provide evidence of the nature or
magnitude of the costs. Thus, the Appellate Body held that China had not met
its burden of proving that the alternative was not reasonable and its measure was
'
accordingly not "necessary to protect public morals."192
The Appellate Body has not fully explained what is meant by an "undue
burden" imposed by a proposed alternative measure. On one hand, it is clear
that an alternative will not be held to be unreasonable merely because it imposes

Report of the Appellate Body, US-Gambling at
307-08 (cited in note 33). In subsequent cases,
however, the Appellate Body has sometimes, but not always, stated that an alternative measure
must make an "equivalent contribution" to achieving the respondent's desired level of protection,
as opposed to actually achievingit. See Report of the Appellate Body, Brazil-19res at 156 (cited
in note 94). However, the most recent authority states that a "reasonably available" alternative
measure must preserve the responding party's right to achieve its desired level of protection with
respect to the objective pursued under Article XX. Report of the Appellate Body, ChinaAudiovisuals at 318 (cited in note 170).
188 Report of the Appellate Body, Korea-Beefat 157 (cited in note 90).
187

189

Report of the Appellate Body, US-Gamblingat

190 Id at

308 (cited in note 33).

310.

191 Report of the Appellate Body, China-Audiovisualsat 319 (cited in note 170).
192
Compare id at 328,withReportoftheAppellate Body, US-Gamblingat 321 (cited in note 33).
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some extra costs on the respondent. 93 In Korea-Beef, for example, the measure at
issue had effectively shifted the enforcement costs of protecting against fraud
onto beef importers; the Appellate Body held that it was not unreasonable for
Korea itself to assume those costs by paying for ordinary law enforcement.194
At some point, however, an alternative measure may become so costly or
technically challenging that it imposes not only a burden, but an "undue
burden." It has been suggested that this involves a cost-benefit analysis under
which the trade costs of the Member's measure are balanced against the extra
costs the Member would incur if it adopted the proposed alternative.' 9 5 Regan
argues that this form of balancing provides "a kind of safety-valve on the lessrestrictive alternative test" that ensures that Members are not prevented from
achieving their chosen level of protection with respect to a legitimate
objective.'96 However, if applied too strictly it could also have negative effects. A
direct comparison of trade costs with the costs of the proposed alternative might
obscure other considerations. These include the potentially limited resources of
the responding Member-for example, if the Member was a developing
country-and also whether more expenditure on an alternative measure would
force resources to be withdrawn from other areas. To date, no WTO case has
squarely raised the issue of how the extra costs of alternative measures are to be
assessed. An approach is required that considers the trade-restrictiveness of the
challenged measure in a manner that is sensitive to the respondent's particular
circumstances. 97
Perhaps the most critical aspect of the alternative measure analysis is that
the measure proposed by the complainant must meet the respondent's level of
protection.198 This is because WTO tribunals do not question the
appropriateness of the respondent's objective, only whether it falls within one of
the exceptions and whether there is a sufficient connection between the measure
and the objective to demonstrate that the exception applies. 99 Thus, the
Appellate Body has stated that "it is undisputed that WTO Members have the

193

Report of the Appellate Body, US-Gambling at 308 (cited in note 33); Report of the Appellate
Body, China-Audiovisualsat 327 (cited in note 170).

194 Report of the Appellate Body, Korea-Beef at
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180-81 (cited in note 90); see also Report of the
Appellate Body, China-Audiovisualsat n 603 (cited in note 170).
Regan, World Trade Rev at 349 (cited in note 161).
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Id at 358.

197

Report of the Appellate Body, US-Gamblingat
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Report of the Appellate Body, Korea-Beef at 176 (cited in note 90); Report of the Appellate
Body, EC-Asbestos at 168 (cited in note 92); Report of the Appellate Body, China-Audiovisualsat
318 (cited in note 170).
Lovric, Deference to the Legislature in WTO at 143 (cited in note 174).

199

308 (cited in note 33).

Vol. 14 No. 1

Comparing the Concept of 'Necessily"

Mitchell and Henckels

right to determine the level of protection [of the objectives set out in Article
XX] that they consider appropriate." 2"
It has been argued that the weighing and balancing exercise has the
potential to undermine this right because the tribunal makes its own
determination of the importance of the respondent's objective. The tribunal
could therefore conclude that a measure was not "necessary" even though there
is no alternative that would achieve the respondent's level of protection."0 Such
an approach places significantly more power in the hands of WTO tribunals and
reduces the autonomy of members. However, this criticism may misunderstand
the nature of the analysis of the importance of the objective and its relationship
to the respondent's chosen level of protection. The Appellate Body has
emphasized that the level of protection chosen by a Member should be thought
20 2
of as the "objective" the Member seeks to achieve by implementing its measure.
Although the Member's process of determining a level of protection necessarily
involves an assessment of how important the Member believes the objective to
be, the level of protection itself is not necessarily undermined by a WTO
tribunal undertaking its own inquiry into the importance of the objective. This is
because once the Member has determined the desired level of protection, the
tribunal must respect it. Thus the importance inquiry can only affect the degree
to which the tribunal will be willing to accept that a proposed alternative
measure would achieve the Member's level of protection, not whether the level
of protection itself is appropriate. Moreover, even if importance and level of
protection are regarded as linked in a way that could affect Members' rights to
achieve legitimate objectives, in practice the importance inquiry has not
undermined those rights because WTO tribunals have always, to date, found the
respondent's objective to be of high importance. It is of more concern that the
Appellate Body has occasionally rejected the level of protection stated by a
Member as not reflecting the true level of protection the Member sought to
achieve, as it did in Korea-Beef. 3 However, in principle this simply reflects the
fact that the objective pursued by the measure must be determined objectively
by the tribunal. Thus, what the Member declares its level of protection to be will
not necessarily be determinative, but once the level of protection has been
established, any proposed alternative must meet it.
200
201

202

203

Report of the Appellate Body, EC-Asbestos at 168 (cited in note 92).
See Neumann and Tirk, 37 J World Trade at 232-33 (cited in note 162); Ortino, Basic Legal
Instrumentsfor the Liberalisationof Trade at 472 (cited in note 38); Regan, World Trade Rev at 348
(cited in note 161); Peter Van den Bossche, Looking for Proporfionaliy in [VO Law, 35 Legal Issues
of Econ Integration 283, 284 (2008).
World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Australia-MeasuresAffecting Importationof
Salmon 200, WTO Doc No WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct 20,1998) (Australia-Salmon).
See also Report of the Appellate Body, DR-Cigarettesat 72 (cited in note 92).
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4. The relevance of the chapeau to necessity analysis.
Even if the respondent demonstrates that its measure is "necessary" under
one of the sub-clauses of Article XX or XV, the exception is not made out
unless the respondent can also show that the measure is not applied in a manner
constituting "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" or a "disguised restriction
on international trade"2' under the chapeau to the provision. The purpose of
the chapeau is to prevent abuse of the exceptions by requiring that Members
apply measures consistently if they are to be fully justified." In essence,
discrimination will be "arbitrary or unjustifiable" if it is not rationally connected
to the objective according to which the measure has been provisionally justified
under one of the sub-clauses.2 6
In one sense, the chapeau imposes a second suitability test by requiring that
the measure at issue is applied consistently---or at least that any inconsistencies
are justified according to the policy objective of the measure." It may be that
this has in turn influenced the Appellate Body's approach to necessity because
the chapeau effectively acts as a second check to determine whether the measure
is really being applied in good faith in circumstances where it is necessary to
achieve a legitimate objective. This being the case, it is not necessary for the
necessity test to be excessively strict, for example by requiring that a measure not
have discriminatory effects to be "necessary."
The jurisprudence has not elaborated on the connection between the tests
of necessity and discrimination, but it is arguably apparent from the Appellate
Body's reasoning. In US-Gasoline, the Appellate Body held that it is not the
underlying violation that should be examined for "necessity," but the measure as
a whole.2 8 Given that the underlying violation is often some form of
discrimination, it is the task of the chapeau to determine whether that
discrimination is "arbitrary or unjustifiable." It is not the task of the sub-clause
to take discrimination into account when determining whether the measure is
"necessary." This forms the basis of much of the Appellate Body's jurisprudence
on the general exceptions. Surprisingly, however, the Appellate Body recently
held in Thailand-Cigarettesfrom the Philippines that "what must be shown to be
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"Disguised restriction" includes both arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination and, more broadly,
measures which, although not discriminatory, "conceal the pursuit of trade -restrictive objectives."
Report of the Appellate Body, US-Gasoline at 25 (cited in note 174).
Id at 22.
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Report of the Appellate Body, BrazjlI-yres II at
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Bown and Trachtman, 8 World Trade Rev at 87 (cited in note 177).

208

Report of the Appellate Body, US-Gasoline at 16 (cited in note 174).
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227 (cited in note 94).
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necessary is the treatment giving rise to the finding of less favorable
treatment, ' appearing to reverse its previous position.
In any case, although some commentators have remarked upon the
possible impact of the chapeau on the necessity test,210 it is difficult to find direct
evidence of this in the case law. Moreover, as discussed below, the Appellate
Body has used the general exceptions' necessity test to guide its approach to
other provisions of the WTO Agreements that have a necessity requirement, but
not a chapeau. Thus, it appears that although the chapeau may have influenced
the development of the necessity test under Articles XX and XIV, that test is
wholly capable of standing on its own. Therefore, although sensitivity to context
is required, the presence of the chapeau does not preclude the WTO necessity
test informing the approach taken by investment tribunals.
B. The Security Exceptions

in the GATT and GATS

In addition to the general exceptions, Article XXI of the GATT and
Article XIV bis of GATS contain exceptions that Members may invoke to justify
their "essential security interests." Both Articles provide that a Member will not
be "prevented from taking any action which it considers necessagy for the
protection" of those interests."' However, such actions must relate to
fissionable materials, arms or the military establishment, or alternatively must be
'
taken "in time of war or other emergency in international relations."212
The critical difference between the general and security exceptions is that
the latter allow Members to determine whether an action is "necessary" for their
security. The evident purpose of this much lower, and perhaps non-justiciable,
test is to preserve the autonomy of WTO Members in security matters.
However, it has also led to concern that the scope of the security exceptions is
self-judging.213 Despite this, the security exceptions were rarely used under the
GATT 1947 and have never been adjudicated in WTO tribunals.214 There is
accordingly very little relevant jurisprudence.

209

See Section IV.C.

210

Alvarez and Brink, Revisiting the NecessiLy Defense at 347 (cited in note 88).
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GAT1 Agreement, Article XXI(b) (cited in note 2); GATS, Article XIV his (1)(b) (cited in note

212

17) (emphasis added).
GATf Agreement, ArticleXiXI(b)(i)-(iii) (citedinnote 15); GATS, Article X1V bis(1)(b)(i)-(iii).

213

GATT Panel Report, United States-Trade MeasuresAffecting Nicaragua 5.17, GA'IT Doc L/6053

214

(Oct 13, 1986, unadopted); Wesley A. Cann Jr., CreatingStandardsand Acconntabiliyfor the Use ofthe
[F0, Securioy Exception: Reducing the Role ofPower-BasedRelationsandEstablishinga New Balance Between
Sovereigno andMultilateralism,26 YaleJ Intl L 413 (2001).
But see John A. Spanogle Jr., Can Helms-BurtonBe Challenged under FFO?, 27 Stetson L Rev 1313
(1998).
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C. Necessity in Other WTO Agreements
The concept of necessity is also used in key provisions of the SPS
Agreement 21s and the TBT Agreement.216 Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement
requires Members to "ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is
applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health," 217 while Article 5.6 contains a more specific obligation that "Members
shall ensure that such measures are not more trade-restrictive than required to
218
achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection.,
Similarly, Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement provides that "technical regulations
shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective,
taking account of the risks non-fulfillment would create" and that "[s]uch
legitimate objectives are, inter alia: national security requirements; the prevention
of deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life
or health, or the environment. "219 Both Agreements are also explicitly intended
to expand and supplement the disciplines contained in the GATT 1994. One of
the stated purposes of the TBT Agreement is to "further the objectives of
GATT 1994,"' 0 while the SPS Agreement is designed to "elaborate rules for the
application of the provisions of GATT 1994 which relate to the use of sanitary
or phytosanitary measures, in particular the provisions of Article XX(b).,,2
1. The SPS Agreement.
Articles 2.2 and 5.6 of the SPS Agreement contain similar concepts to
those that are relevant under the general exceptions. Article 2.2 provides a
general standard of necessity, while Article 5.6 elaborates on that standard,'
codifying both the "least restrictive means" test and the concept of an
"appropriate level of protection." Further, "technical and economic feasibility"
must be taken into account in the consideration of alternative measures and such
alternatives must (i) achieve the respondent's level of protection and (ii) be

215

SPS Agreement (cited in note 17).

216

TBT Agreement (cited in note 15).

217

SPS Agreement, Art 2.2 (cited in note 17).

218

Id at Art 5.6.
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TBT Agreement, Art 2.2 (cited in note 15).
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Id at Preamble.
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SPS Agreement, Preamble (cited in note 17); GATT, Art XX(b) (applying to measures "necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health") (cited in note 2).
Report of the Appellate Body, Australia-Apples at 339 (cited in note 153).
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"significantly" less restrictive to trade.' "Appropriate level of protection" is
defined as "[t]he level of protection deemed appropriate by the Member." 4
These provisions reflect many of the concepts developed by the Appellate
Body in its jurisprudence on the general exceptions. However, they provide
Members with greater autonomy because they require that alternative measures
must be "significant' less trade restrictive and the level of protection is "deemed"
by the Member, indicating that tribunals cannot question a Member's assertion
of its own level of protection." In Australia-Salmon, the Appellate Body
affirmed that "[t]he determination of the appropriate level of protection is a
prerogative of the Member concerned and not of the Panel or of the Appellate
Body." 6 However, the Appellate Body also found that the SPS Agreement
contains an "implicit obligation" to determine an appropriate level of protection
before adopting a sanitary or phytosanitary measure, 227 and that where a Member
has not done so with sufficient precision the WTO tribunals may determine its
level of protection on the basis of the measure itself.2 Thus, although the SPS
Agreement preserves Members' rights to declare their own policy objective,
there is still scope for a tribunal to make its own assessment if the Member has
not done so.
In Australia-Salmon, which concerned import restrictions imposed on
imported salmon, ostensibly to protect the local salmon population from
disease, these principles led to an outcome the reverse of that which occurred in
Korea-Beef. Australia expressly stated that its level of protection was "very
conservative," but the Panel instead assessed it as "zero-risk" on the basis that
the measure itself was a total ban.2 9 However, the Appellate Body rejected this
reasoning as a subversion of Australia's prerogative to "deem" its own level of
protection, and accordingly it determined that the level was "very conservative"
rather than "zero-risk." Thus, while in Korea-Beefthe Appellate Body rejected
the level of protection asserted by the responding Member and instead inferred
it from the measure at issue, in Australia-Salmonit was held that the Member's
statement of its level of protection binds WTO tribunals even if it is lower than
the level reflected in its measure. Although they seem inconsistent, these results
223

SPS Agreement, n 3 (cited in note 17).

224

ld at Annex A(5) (emphasis added).

225
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Report of the Appellate Body, Australia-Salmon at IM 199-200 (cited in note 202). See also
Kapterian, 59 Intl & Comp L Q at 113 (cited in note 162).
Report of the Appellate Body, Australia-Salmon at 199 (cited in note 202).
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125.

230 Report of the Appellate Body, Australia-Salmonat N 197-99 (cited in note 198).
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may be reconcilable on the basis that in both cases the Appellate Body was
assessingwhat it believed to be the actual level of protection. Nevertheless, the
Appellate Body's statements in Australia-Salmon appear to enable Members to
conclusively assert their chosen level of protection, which Korea was not able to
do in Korea-Beef.
Another way in which the necessity test in Article 5.6 may differ from the
general exceptions is that it appears to preclude the balancing of factors such as
importance, trade restrictiveness, and contribution to a legitimate objective. This
is because the footnote to Article 5.6 states that "a measure is not more traderestrictive than required unless there is" an alternative measure that meets all of
its requirements. 23' Although this has not been addressed in the jurisprudence,
this may mean that a tribunal cannot strike down a measure simply because, for
example, it does not adequately contribute to its objective and is highly trade
restrictive. In the absence of a reasonably available alternative, a measure will be
consistent with the provision. The more general necessity test contained in
Article 2.2 may also involve balancing, but again, this has yet to be ruled upon.
As Articles 2.2 and 5.6 contain positive obligations rather than exceptions,
the Appellate Body has held that the complainant must raise a primafacie case
that the measure infringes them before the burden switches to the respondent to
provide a rebuttal.2 32 This differs significantly from the approach under the
general exceptions, where the complainant only needs to propose a measure to
activate the respondent's burden of proving that it is not reasonably available.
Because of the subject matter of the SPS Agreement, which typically
applies to measures designed to protect against diseases and other threats to
health, 3 the complainant's burden will often require it to prove detailed
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SPS Agreement, n 3 (cited in note 17) (emphasis added).
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World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities-Measures
97-109, WTO Doc Nos WT/DS26/AB/R,
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)
WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan 16, 1998) (EC-Hormones); World Trade Organization, Report of the
Appellate Body, Japan-Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples IM 152-53, WTO Doc No
WT/DS245/AB/R (Nov 26, 2003).
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Annex A(1) of the SPS Agreement contains the test for its applicability, providing.
Sanitary or phytosanitary measure - Any measure applied:
(a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member
from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases,
disease-carrying organisms or disease-causing organisms;
(b) to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the
Member from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or diseasecausing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs;
(c) to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from
risks arising from diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or
from the entry, establishment or spread of pests; or
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technical matters demonstrating that its proposed alternative would achieve the
respondent's level of protection. This raises the question of the standard of
review to be exercised by WTO tribunals in SPS disputes when determining
technical or scientific issues in which they are unlikely to have expertise: as the
Appellate Body said in Australia-Apples, "we cannot conceive of how a
complainant could satisfy its burden of demonstrating that its proposed
alternative measure would meet the appropriate level of protection under Article
5.6 without relying on evidence that is scientific in nature."' In EC-Hormones,
the Appellate Body held on the basis of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding 5 that "the applicable standard is neither de novo review as such,
nor 'total deference,' but rather the 'objective assessment of the facts.' 236 This
vague standard could give WTO Panels significant scope to determine scientific
or technical controversies according to their own views of competing evidence,
limited only by the requirement that their assessment be "objective." However,
as the Appellate Body stressed, Members have a right to adopt measures based
on "divergent or minority" scientific views without panels rejecting their
conclusions based on other scientific evidence.7
2. The TBT agreement.
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement provides that TBT measures must not
be "more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective. ' ' "3 As
under the SPS Agreement, the complainant bears the burden of raising a prima
fade case of inconsistency with this requirement, which the respondent must

234
235

236
237

238

(d) to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from
the entry, establishment or spread of pests.
Sanitary or phytosanitary measures include all relevant laws, decrees,
regulations, requirements and procedures including, inter alia, end product
criteria; processes and production methods; testing, inspection, certification
and approval procedures; quarantine treatments including relevant
requirements associated with the transport of animals or plants, or with the
materials necessary for their survival during transport; provisions on relevant
statistical methods, sampling procedures and methods of risk assessment; and
packaging and labeling requirements directly related to food safety.
SPS Agreement, Annex A(1) (cited in note 17).
Report of the Appellate Body, Australia-Apples at 364 (cited in note 153).
World Trade Organization, Understandigon Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Article 11, online at http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/analytic-indexe/dsu_05 e.
htm#articlel 1 (visited Apr 14, 2013).
Report of the Appellate Body, EC-Asbestos at 117 (cited in note 92).
World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United States-ContinuedSuspension of
Obligationsin the EC Hormones Dispute 591, WTO Doc No WT/DS320/AB/R (Oct 16, 2008) ("a
panel should review whether the particular conclusions drawn by the Member assessing the risk
find sufficient support in the scientific evidence relied upon").
TBT Agreement, Art 2.2 (cited in note 15).
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rebut.239 Legitimate objectives include, but are not limited to, national security,
the prevention of deceptive practices, and the protection of human health or
safety, animal or plant life health, or the environment." In US-Clove Cigarettes,
the Panel held that Article XX/XIV jurisprudence was relevant to the
interpretation of Article 2.2 and proceeded to follow the test described in KoreaBeef 241 The Panel acknowledged differences between the provisions, such as that
Article 2.2 is not an exception to an underlying obligation, but held that these
242
were not sufficient to demonstrate that a different standard should apply.
Moreover, in US-COOL the Panel did not appear to believe that the lack of a
chapeau to Article 2.2 is a relevant point of distinction, noting that some of the
to the TBT Agreement is similar to the chapeaux to
wording of the Preamble
243
X1V.
and
XX
Articles
In US-Tuna II, the Appellate Body confirmed that the list of "legitimate
objectives" in Article 2.2 is open rather than exhaustive. 2' Further, it held that
the list of express objectives should be used as a "reference point" for
determining what other "legitimate objectives" the provision might cover, as
well as finding that objectives found throughout the WTO Agreements "may
provide guidance for, or may inform, the analysis of what might be considered
to be a legitimate objective.,"245 Thus, where a provision is broadly expressed to
cover a range of objectives, the text and purposes of the entire treaty may be
examined to determine whether a particular objective falls within its scope.

240

World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Measures Concerning the
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products 323, WTO Doc No WT/DS381 /AB/R
(May 16, 2012) (US-Tuna II).
TBT Agreement, Art 2.2 (cited in note 15).

241

World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, United States-MeasuresAffecting the Productionand
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Sale of Clove CigarettesIM7.368-7.369, 7.379, WTO Doc No WT/DS406/R (Sept 2, 2011) (US
Clove Cigarettes); see also World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, United States-Certain
Countiy of Origin Labeling (COOL) Requirements % 7.669-7.670, WTO Doc Nos WT/DS384/R,
WT/DS386/R (Nov 18, 2011) (US-COOL).
Report of the Panel, US-Clove Cigarettesat 7.362-7.366 (cited in note 241). This finding was not
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TBT Agreement between states obligations not to create unnecessary obstacles to international
trade and states' right to regulate was "not, in principle, different from the balance set out in the
GAIT 1994." World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, US-Clove Cigarettes,
WTO Doc No WT/DS406/AB/R (Apr 4, 2012).
7.670 (cited in note 241). See also World Trade
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On the other hand, the Appellate Body also held that "[a] panel is not
bound by a Member's characterization of the objectives it pursues through the
measure, but must independently and objectively assess them."246 This appears at
odds with the approach taken under the SPS Agreement, where it is a Member's
prerogative to declare its level of protection. However, the Appellate Body was
distinguishing between the purpose of a measure in the broad sense-such as
whether it is generally directed to protecting health-and the level ofprotecton in
the sense of the precise objective the Member seeks to achieve by adopting the
measure. The Appellate Body recognized that the concept of "fulfill[ment]" of
an objective in Article 2.2 refers to "provid[ing] fully what is wished for," '47 thus
preserving the right of Members to achieve their objectives. In this respect, the
Appellate Body also drew on the Preamble to the TBT Agreement, which states
that "no country should be prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure
the quality of its exports, or for the protection of human, animal or plant life or
health, of the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive practices, at the
levels it considers appropriate."248 In the Appellate Body's view, this indicates
that "a WTO Member, by preparing, adopting, and applying a measure in order
to pursue a legitimate objective, articulates either implicitly or explicitly the level
at which it seeks to pursue that particular legitimate objective. "249 Thus, the right
of Members to achieve their level of protection is preserved, but their right to
assert that level of protection is not absolute, as it appears to be under the SPS
Agreement. Instead, WTO tribunals determine the level of protection from the
measure itself, although no doubt the statements of the Member are taken into
account.
Balancing of the kind undertaken under Article XX of the GAlT is also a
part of the analysis under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. In US-Tuna I, the
Appellate Body articulated a very similar test to the suitability test under the
general exceptions provisions:
The Appellate Body has previously noted that the word "necessary" refers
to a range of degrees of necessity, depending on the connection in which it
is used. In the context of Article 2.2, the assessment of "necessity" involves
a relational analysis of the trade-restrictiveness of the technical regulation,
the degree of contribution that it makes to the achievement of a legitimate
objective, and the risks non-fulfillment would create.250
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The Appellate Body confirmed that a TBT measure can meet the
requirement of suitability where it "partially achieves" its objective2"' and need
not completely attain its objective in order to be considered necessary to achieve
it.252

The Appellate Body also held that a least-restrictive means analysis was
part of the necessity test and hinted at an explanation of the relationship
between the suitability and least restrictive means parts of the WTO necessity
test:
In most cases, [the analysis under Article 2.2] would involve a comparison
of the trade-restrictiveness and the degree of achievement of the objective
by the measure at issue with that of possible alternative measures that may
be reasonably available and less trade restrictive than the challenged
measure, taking account of the risks non-fulfillment would create. The
Appellate Body has clarified that a comparison with reasonably available
alternative measures is a conceptual tool for the purpose of ascertaining
253
whether a challenged measure is more trade restrictive than necessary.
This folds the two tests into one another, suggesting that the factors in the
suitability test can be seen as criteria that must be met by a proposed alternative
measure if it is to be "reasonably available." Further, the requirement that "the
risks of non-fulfillment" must be taken into account appears to mirror the
importance element in the suitability test under Articles XX and XIV: the higher
the risks, the more circumspect the tribunal should be in determining that a
proposed alternative is "reasonably available." Nevertheless, the two tests may
not have been wholly conflated. The Appellate Body stated that "[i]n order to
make a primafacie case, the complainant must present evidence and arguments
sufficient to establish that the challenged measure is more trade restrictive than
necessary." It added that "ki]n making its primafade case, a complainant may also
seek to identify a possible alternative measure that is less trade restrictive, makes an
equivalent contribution to the relevant objective, and is reasonably available. "2
This confirms that a complainant does not necessarify need to propose an
alternative measure to show that the measure at issue is not "unnecessary."
Thus, an argument purely based on trade-restrictiveness and contribution to the
relevant objective, taking into account the risks of non-fulfillment of that
objective, might suffice to show that the measure is not necessary. However, the
Appellate Body also elaborated:
We can identify at least two instances where a comparison of the challenged
measure and possible alternative measures may not be required. For
251
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example, it would seem to us that if a measure is not trade restrictive, then it
may not be inconsistent with Article 2.2. Conversely, if a measure is trade
restrictive and makes no contribution to the achievement of the legitimate
objective, then it may be inconsistent with Artide 2.2.255
This suggests, but does not fully confirm, that where a measure makes a
contribution to its objective, the existence of a reasonably available less
restrictive alternative must always be proven to demonstrate that the measure is
not "necessary." It also provides a stricter test than either the GATT Article XX
or SPS Article 5.6 tests, because the alternative must only be as effective as the
respondent's actual measure. Under Articles XX and 5.6, the alternative must
achieve the respondent's objective, in the sense of its chosen level of protection,
rather than simply the actual contribution to that objective made by its existing
measure.
V. THE UTILITY OF THE WTO APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW
This Part discusses several areas in which international investment tribunals
might, in light of their common function with WTO tribunals, find useful
guidance from WTO necessity analysis. We also identify the limitations of using
WTO case law in this way, including addressing the concerns raised by the
ContinentalTribunal's approach to the use of WXTO case law.
A. Importance of Objective
The importance of the objective that a measure is designed to achieve has
been recognized as a relevant consideration in WTO necessity analysis from the
earliest Appellate Body decisions on Article XX of the GATT. It is also relevant
under the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement, although it sometimes takes
different forms. However, investment tribunals have not consistently referred to
the importance of a measure's objective as a consideration in determining
whether a measure is "necessary." The tribunals in AWG and InterAgua both
stated that in their view "It]he provision of water and sewage services ... was
vital to the health and well-being [of a large population] and was therefore an
' while
essential interest of the Argentine State,"256
other tribunals have referred to
the importance of the host state's objective more obliquely. In Glamis Gold v US,
the Tribunal held that legislation enacted with the objective of preserving
indigenous cultural sites was "necessary for the immediate preservation of the
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public general welfare," but did not specifically affirm the importance of the
objective in this context.2" 7 In the context of Article XI of the Argentina-US
BIT, the ContinentalTribunal only referred to the importance of the objective by
reference to WTO jurisprudence, but did not actually evaluate the importance of
the emergency measures' objective2. 8 (although elsewhere in its decision it
referred to Article XI's purpose of protecting "national interests of a paramount
importance").259 While the LG&E Tribunal referred to the legitimacy of the
actual measures adopted by Argentina, it only referred in passing to the
importance of "protecting [Argentina's] social and economic system.'26O
The role of the necessity test is not for the tribunal to conduct a de novo
review of whether it would have pursued the same policy goal in the
circumstances, but to assess whether the means chosen to achieve the policy
goal were "necessary." As the US-GasolinePanel put it in the first decided WTO
dispute, "it [is] not the necessity of the policy goal that [is] to be examined, but
whether or not [the particular measure is] necessary ... it [i]s therefore not the
task of the Panel to examine the necessity" of the Member's objectives.261 This
approach has a sound basis in policy as well as a justification based on legal
rigor. Firstly, it preserves the right to set legitimate policy goals to governments,
thus avoiding excessive interference with regulatory autonomy. Secondly, it
avoids the inevitably subjective decisionmaking that an assessment of the
legitimacy of an objective entails. What one tribunal would deem to be a
legitimate objective in a given situation another might see as unnecessary.
Indeed, in the context of NPM clauses, investment tribunals have stated their
assessments in terms of vague agreements that the situation prevailing in a
country made action necessary. In Continental v Argentina, for example, the
Tribunal stated that "[i]n general terms, within the economic and financial
situation of Argentina towards the end of 2001, the Measures at issue .. were in
or unavoidable, in part indispensable and in any case material or
part inevitable,
decisive.' ' 262 The LG&E Tribunal similarly stated that "Argentina was in a
period of crisis during which it was necessary to enact measures to maintain
public order and protect its essential security interests."26 3 This is precisely the
kind of reasoning that the WTO approach is designed to avoid because it slips
257
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dangerously close to an assessment of whether the objective behind the
measures, rather than the measures themselves, were necessary. The concept of
a chosen or appropriate level of protection is a useful analytical tool to prevent
this kind of reasoning and to preserve an appropriate level of national policy
autonomy. Other tribunals have, however, referred to or afforded deference in
their evaluation of host states' regulatory objectives: particularly NAFTA
tribunals, which appear more attuned to these issues."26 The SD Myers v Canada
Tribunal referred to the "high measure of deference" applicable to the
determination of its regulatory objectives.265 Likewise, the Glamis v US Tribunal
indicated that it would not undertake strict scrutiny, stating that the relevant test
was "whether or not there was a manifest lack of reasons for the legislation. "266
The Tribunal also stated that "a tribunal's determination that an agency acted in
a way with which the Tribunal disagrees" is not enough to find that a measure
breached fair and equitable treatment.267
Other tribunals have affirmed the importance of host state regulatory
objectives, but without performing necessity analysis. For example, the Total v
Argentina Tribunal noted briefly that the pesification and related measures
adopted by Argentina in response to its financial crisis had a legitimate objective,
and undertook a balancing test to find that the measures did not breach fair and
equitable treatment. 68 In Genin v Estonia, the Tribunal found that authorities'
revocation of the investor's banking license was a legitimate regulatory decision
on the basis of concerns about the bank's management and financial soundness,
which was crucial to its finding that Estonia did not breach fair and equitable
treatment.269 In EDF v Romania, the Tribunal held that a measure revoking the
licenses of operators of duty-free stores pursued a "legitimate aim in the public
interest," namely addressing the potential for corruption in the sector, and that
the importance of achieving this objective outweighed the impact on the
*270
investor.
In several respects, the assessment of importance in necessity analysis is a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, the concept of "necessity" inevitably
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raises the question of how important the objective in question is considered to
be and who is competent to decide the question (a government or a tribunal).
Because policy choices involve balancing multiple priorities and allocating
limited resources, the importance ascribed to a particular objective will affect a
government's decision on whether to adopt a measure in an attempt to achieve
that objec-tive. It seems apposite, then, that tribunals should assess the
importance of a measure's objective as part of their assessment of whether the
measure is necessary. To refrain from doing so risks an attenuated analysis that
does not fully incorporate all of the relevant factors involved and risks the
approbation of measures even where they pursue discriminatory or otherwise
impermissible objectives.
However, there are two major drawbacks to the assessment of the
importance of a measure's objective. The first is that it may intrude upon the
right of states to set their own legitimate policy priorities. At the very least, it
provides a smokescreen behind which an adjudicator can undermine the state's
chosen level of protection or extent of preferred achievement of the objective
while claiming to respect the state's regulatory autonomy. In the context of the
WTO Agreement, this may undermine the right of Members to select their own
level of protection of the policy values embodied in the Agreement as legitimate
objectives. Thus, as Kapterian argues, while the Appellate Body's jurisprudence
in cases such as EC-Asbestos has "reinforce[d] the fact that the weighing and
balancing test [does] not involve balancing the level of protection against the
trade restriction," it also "highlight[ed] the extent to which the importance of the
value being sought . . . dictate[s] the survival of the measure."27' 1 The point is that

allowing a tribunal to assess the importance of an objective carries with it the
risk that this assessment will undermine the government's own assessment of
the importance of a particular policy goal, as reflected both in its level of
protection or achievement of that objective, and ultimately, in its measure.
These concerns have been borne out in international investment decisions,
where tribunals have held that the host state acted with impermissible objectives
though it is arguable that authorities acted in good faith. The Metaldad v Mexico
and Tecmedv Mexico decisions both concerned situations where authorities resiled
from previous representations that they would grant permits in relation to the
construction or operation of hazardous waste facilities.272 Both tribunals held
that the authorities had acted for reasons related to their constituencies'
opposition to the facilities, and that these were impermissible reasons for
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denying the permits.273 These decisions are amenable to the criticism that the
tribunals did not afford due deference to the host state in its response to the
concerns of its population.274 Other tribunals have briefly remarked, in the
context of fair and equitable treatment, that a host state would violate its
commitments to a foreign investor if it regulated in the absence of "justification
of an economic, social or other nature, 27 5 regulated in bad faith276 or departed
from representations without a legitimate objective277 (although their decisions
have not turned on the determination of these issues).
In the WTO context, although the Appellate Body did not explicitly assess
the importance of Korea's objective of preventing fraud in Korea-Beef, by
rejecting Korea's assertion of its own level of protection and replacing it with an
assessment based on all of the facts before it, the Appellate Body implicitly
determined that Korea's objective was not of high importance and therefore its
level of protection must be lower than it claimed.278 According to Du, the result
was that the Appellate Body did in fact balance Korea's level of protection
against the impact of its measure on trade:
[Tihe rationale behind the ruling in Korea-Beef is that the harm caused by
passing off different kinds of beef is modest. Compared with the adverse
trade effects imposed on imported beef, Korea's regulatory purpose in this
case must give way to trade liberalization, even if this means that Korean
consumers will be less well protected and Korea's preferred ALOP
["appropriate level of protection"] is likely to be compromised. 279
On this reading of the case, the Appellate Body's reasoning belies its
assertion that "lilt is not open to doubt that Members of the WTO have the
right to determine for themselves the level of enforcement of their WTOconsistent laws and regulations. '"280
The second potential drawback is that despite over a decade of case law,
the role of the assessment of the importance of the measure's objective in WTO
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necessity analysis is still not entirely clear. Initially, it was expressed as a factor to
be weighed against other factors, including contribution to the objective and
trade restrictiveness. In later cases, it has been expressed as a separate
consideration "in the light" of which the other factors are to be weighed.28'
Further, the Appellate Body has directed panels to conduct the least restrictive
means test with the importance of the objective in mind, although precisely how
it should affect the tribunal's analysis is unclear. The best reading of the WTO
case law is that tribunals should be more cautious of finding that a measure is
not "necessary" the more important its objective. The function of the
assessment of the importance of the objective is therefore to set the tribunal's
standard of review for the least restrictive means test that follows. However, it is
difficult to see precisely how this is operationalized in the case law, beyond a
general observation that measures with what the Appellate Body considers to be
more important objectives tend to be upheld, or substantially upheld, more
often.282

Nevertheless, these concerns may be overstated in the WTO context.
When used to set the standard of review, the assessment of an objective's
importance is a positive attribute of necessity analysis that shows appropriate
sensitivity to the way governments make decisions. There will inevitably be some
concern about tribunals coming to their own conclusions about the importance
of a measure's objective. However, the actual assessment is formulated in WTO
case law as an assessment of the "common interests or values" protected by the
measure.283 Thus, while the test inevitably involves a determination of values by
a tribunal, this assessment is limited to values that are "common" amongst
WTO members.
Further, although assessment of the importance of a measure's objective
can be used as a shield to undermine the right to set an appropriate level of
protection, there is no necessary connection between the two: indeed they are
conceptually separate. The assessment of the importance of a measure's
objective involves assessing whether the objective pursues "common values"
engaged by the measure, while the level of protection is the objective the
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respondent seeks to achieve. Assessment of the former by the tribunal does not
necessarily undermine the latter, and indeed to do so would be a legal error
according to the Appellate Body's own pronouncements. But some uncertainties
remain with respect to the determination of an objective's legitimacy where it is
not specified in the treaty text. It remains to be seen how the "common values"
approach applies in the context of an objective that is not pursued by other
WTO members.
Analyzing the importance of a measure's objective as a factor in necessity
analysis might well improve the decision making process of investment tribunals.
However, the WTO experience demonstrates that the exact role of this stage of
analysis needs to be clearly explained and transparently applied to avoid
undermining the right of parties to determine their own legitimate policy goals.
While, as noted above, WTO tribunals have referred to certain policy objectives
being shared by WTO members, this approach is potentially problematic in the
context of international investment law.2" Given that the operative provisions of
international investment agreements do not generally specify legitimate
objectives," investment tribunals should generally display a high degree of
deference toward host states' regulatory objectives in their assessment of the
importance of a measure's objective. While the assessment of an objective's
importance can intrude on regulatory autonomy in cases where a tribunal
disagrees with a state's assessment, the reasoning and decisionmaking of
investment tribunals would be improved by adopting an inviolable rule, as WTO
tribunals have frequently reiterated, that states may determine their own
legitimate policy objectives, which will not be undermined by the tribunal in any
subsequent necessity analysis. The purpose of the assessment of the importance
of the legitimacy of a measure's objective, therefore, should be to identify cases
where the measure pursues a discriminatory, protectionist or otherwise
impermissible objective, including where its ostensible objective is a pretext for
an impermissible objective. It should not function as a means for tribunals to
second guess the objective's importance or impugn the state's desired level of
protection or achievement of that objective.286
B. Contribution to Objective
The WTO suitability test as applied in Brazil-Tyres affords substantial
deference to measures that form part of a complex set of mutually supportive
284
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measures directed at achieving a particular policy goal. Thus, a measure may be
considered necessary even if its individual contribution to a policy goal cannot
be demonstrated, as long as it can be shown, on the basis of evidence and
reasoning, that the measure is "apt to produce a material contribution to the
achievement of its objective.""28 However, as explained above, the aptness of a
measure to achieve its objective is only a threshold question in the analysis of
necessity. If a respondent can show that its measure forms part of a suite of
measures designed to achieve a particular goal, a WTO tribunal will then assess
its importance and trade restrictiveness before determining whether there is a
less restrictive measure that is equally suitable.
Investment tribunals have not generally referred to the criterion of
suitability in their review of measures. Whether "aptness" can satisfy the test of
necessity in the absence of demonstrated contribution to the objective has only
been discussed obliquely in investment decisions. In LG&E, the Tribunal
determined that a package of "across-the-board solutions" satisfied the necessity
test in Article XIV88 The Tribunal did not consider the individual contribution of
each element of the package, but, like the Appellate Body in Brazil-Tyres, it
accepted that the components were mutually reinforcing and thus necessary
aspects of the overall response.2" 9
In Continental, the Tribunal directly appropriated the "aptness" standard
from Bra.zil-Tyres, but applied it without a full application of the weighing and
balancing test for suitability that would follow under WTO law. The Tribunal
misstated the question as "whether the Measures were apt to and did make such
a material or a decisive contribution" to their objective.29 The test stated by the
Appellate Body and applied by the Tribunal is more accurately stated as
"whether the Measures were apt to or did make such a material or a decisive
contribution"-the innovation of the test being that measures that may not have
demonstrably made an actual contribution to their objective may still be
necessary. However, the ContinentalTribunalthen applied the "aptness" standard
without any assessment of actual contribution, stating:
In general terms, within the economic and financial situation of Argentina
towards the end of 2001, the Measures at issue (the Corralito, the Corralon,
the pesification, the default and the subsequent restructuring of those debt
instruments involved here) were in part inevitable, or unavoidable, in part
indispensable and in any case material or decisive in order to react positively
to the crisis, to prevent the complete break-down of the financial system,
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the implosion of the economy and the growing threat to the fabric of
Argentinean society and generally to assist in overcoming the crisis. 291

Thus, the Tribunal's determination was based on an assessment that the
measures were a "positive reaction" adopted for the purpose of arresting
Argentina's financial crisis, not on a finding that they achieved that objective. On
this basis, the Tribunal held, quoting Brazil-Tyres, that the measures met the
suitability test because there was "a genuine relationship of end and means. 292
However, as the Appellate Body made clear in its report, this was not a
determination that the measures at issue satisfied the suitability test, but simply a
finding on one element of that test: that "a contribution exists when there is a
genuine relationship of ends and means between the objective pursued and the
measure at issue."293 This does not address the importance or trade (or, in this
case, investment) restrictiveness elements, nor does it constitute balancing.
Nevertheless, the Continental Tribunal overlooked these components of the
Appellate Body's decision, moving directly from contribution to considering the
availability of alternative measures without fully applying the WTO's suitability
test.29

The "aptness" standard in WTO law is still embryonic and is yet to be fully
clarified. For example, it is not clear whether the Appellate Body's reasoning
applies to novel measures, for which evidence of actual contribution may be
unavailable because they have never been applied before, or whether it applies
only to measures that are part of a broader strategic initiative. Nevertheless,
whether a measure is "apt" to contribute to its objective was never meant to be a
conclusive test of suitability. The selective application of elements of this test
means that the ContinentalTribunal neglected other relevant factors, including
the importance of the objective and the impact of the measure on the investor's
interests, before turning to least restrictive means analysis. It is a positive
development that investment tribunals have begun to apply the "apt" approach.
Without it, certain kinds of measures could be arbitrarily struck down simply
because, by their nature, their actual contribution could not be demonstrated.
However, it is important that the full suitability test be applied, not just one
component of it, to ensure that all relevant factors are considered in analyzing
the necessity of the measure at issue.
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C. Whether an Alternative Measure is Reasonably Available
The WTO approach to determining whether a less restrictive alternative
measure is reasonably available involves two essential questions: (i) whether the
alternative measure achieves the respondent's chosen level of protection; and (ii)
whether the alternative measure would impose an "undue burden" in the form
of prohibitive costs or technical difficulties. These concepts contain a number of
considerations that may be relevant for investment tribunals to consider in
assessing whether measures are necessary.295
First, the WTO approach, with the possible exception of the TBT necessity
test, requires not that alternatives achieve the same outcome as the challenged
measure, but that they achieve the outcome that the respondent country desires
to achieve-its level of protection. In some cases, the level of protection
reflected in the measure will be higher than the country's actual level of
29 6 In others, the level of protection may be
protection, as in Australia-Salmon.
determined by examining the measure, as in Korea-Beef.297 And, conceivably, in

still others the state's level of protection might be higher than that reflected in its
measure (although this has not been tested in a WTO dispute). In all cases, the
principle inherent in the concept of respecting a chosen level of protection is
clear: the WTO Agreement may set out those objectives that have been
determined by the Members to be important and legitimate, but each Member
has a right to set its own specific policy goals within those objectives. Such
measures may restrict international trade, but only if they do so to the least
degree possible.
Secondly, the WITO approach requires a case-by-case assessment of the
resources and technical capacity of the respondent to determine whether
measures are "reasonably available." In part, this stems from the concept of a
level of protection, because unless the alternative is actually achievable, the
respondent may be prevented from achieving its policy goal if the tribunal
strikes down its measure. However, this assessment may also involve
consideration not only of whether the alternative is possible for the respondent
but whether the burden it imposes would be "undue." As discussed above, the
exact content of this requirement has not been fully explained in WTO
jurisprudence. Nevertheless, it is arguable that it involves a comparison of the
trade costs that would be saved by the alternative measure and the costs to the
respondent of adopting it.298
295
296
297
298
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Investment tribunals have generally taken a fairly strict approach to
necessity testing. Some tribunals (CMS, Enron, Sempra, AWG, and InterAgua)
determined that an alternative measure was available with little or no
consideration of whether it is actually feasible.9 In relation to CMS, Enron, and
Sempra, this was undoubtedly because they applied, the "only way" requirement
in the customary plea, which precludes invocation of necessity even where other
means are "more costly or less convenient."
While this might preclude the
"undue burden" stage of the WTO analysis, necessity analysis still requires
detailed consideration of whether the respondent could actually adopt the
proposed alternative, taking into account its resources and technical capacities.
Even in that limited sense, investment tribunals could draw on the WTO "undue
burden" analysis, as the Tribunal did in Continental.3 °' It should, however, be
noted that investment tribunals have on some occasions employed a "reasonable
necessity" approach to assess whether authorities had alternative measures
available to achieve the host state's objective, or have questioned tribunals'
institutional capacity to undertake strict necessity analysis.3 2 In this respect,
investment tribunals have demonstrated an understanding that the host state is
often better placed to devise and evaluate the feasibility and efficacy of
alternative measures in the circumstances.
D. The Opacity of the Weighing and Balancing Test
As discussed above, a significant general difficulty with the WTO weighing
and balancing test is its opacity. The test has been expressed in a number of
different ways and indeed seems to change each time it is articulated, despite the
Appellate Body's assertions that it has maintained "the same approach" even
though "the language used is not identical.""3 3 The exact interaction of the
individual elements of the weighing and balancing test is unclear, as is the role
the test plays in the necessity analysis as a whole. As Regan argued in 2007, the
Appellate Body may not have actually set up a balancing test in Korea-Beefand
US-Gambling, but created this perception through the language of their
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decisions.' Whether this test involves the explicit balancing of the importance
of achieving the measure's objective against the importance of liberalized trade
in a manner akin to proportionality analysis remains to be seen. As noted in Part
II, investment tribunals have more readily engaged in this form of balancing.
Despite the potentially intrusive impact of this approach on regulatory
autonomy, the majority of tribunals employing such a balancing test has
followed a deferential approach and has weighed in favor of the host state rather
than the foreign investor." 5
For the purposes of investment tribunals, perhaps the most important
lesson to take from necessity analysis in WTO law is to avoid replicating the
persistent uncertainty surrounding the suitability stage. If the least restrictive
means test is the main method of determining the necessity of a measure, this
should be stated clearly. Further, if suitability analysis is undertaken, its exact
interaction with the least restrictive means test should be described. These issues
have been a persistent problem in WTO law for some time, and also need to be
dealt with in international investment law.
E. Burden of Proof
As noted above, WTO case law establishes that in the context of the
general exceptions, the respondent has the burden of proving that the measure
meets requirements of the least restrictive means test,' but it is up to the
complainant to propose alternative measures and for the respondent to show
that the measure is not reasonably available. 37 SPS and TBT measures, as
positive obligations, entail a different approach whereby the complainant must
make a prima facie case that alternative approaches are reasonably available and
that the measure is therefore not necessary before the burden shifts to the
respondent to demonstrate that the proposed measures are not reasonably
available.
Investment tribunals have not adopted a consistent approach to the burden
of proof in necessity analysis. Of the international investment law cases
examined in this article, the majority of cases do not refer to the burden of
proof. Nor have tribunals generally outlined the process for evaluating
alternative measures: for example, which party bears the burden of identifying
alternative measures, and the host state's role in demonstrating that such
304
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measures are not available. While in several of the Argentine cases tribunals
referred to measures put forward by investors' expert witnesses in the context of
both the NPM clause and the fair and equitable treatment standard, they did not
discuss the relevant treaty provision in terms of whether it constituted a positive
obligation or an exception. 8
In two cases, the burden of proof was discussed more explicitly. In relation
to Article XI, the Continental annulment committee briefly addressed the issue
when affirming the Continental Tribunal's approach to least restrictive means
analysis, stating that the Tribunal had "considered certain specific alternative
measures that Continental claimed could have been adopted ...

alternatives

having been specifically raised by Continental ...were unsurprisingly expressly
considered by the Tribunal. The committee does not see any basis for suggesting
that by doing so, the Tribunal thereby placed the burden of proof on
Continental."3" Thus, the committee suggested that once the investor proposes
alternative measures, the burden shifts to the host state to demonstrate their
unavailability. The TotalTribunal (in the context of the customary plea) affirmed
that Argentina had the burden of persuading the Tribunal that there were no
reasonable alternative measures available to it, which required submitting
evidence to support its position that the impugned measures were prima facie
necessary and rebutting the investor's argument that there were alternative
measures available. 10
WTO tribunals offer an approach to the burden of proof that might
usefully guide international investment law tribunals. Their approach to the
general exceptions has support in the context of international investment law (to
the extent that the decided cases to date reveal consideration of burden of proof
issues). Under NPM provisions, which provide exceptions from treaty-based
obligations, investors only need to point to potential alternative measures, which
is not an onerous obligation. With respect to treaty provisions that impose
positive obligations, the investor needs to raise a prima facie case of
inconsistency by proposing a plausible alternative measure-rather than simply
pointing to a possible alternative. While it might be argued that investors, as
Senipra v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/16 at IN 339, 350 (cited in note 63); Enron v
Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/01/3 at
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opposed to states, are at a disadvantage in making a prima facie case due to their
lack of experience in regulatory policymaking, there is no reason why the
majority of investors should not be able to marshal expert evidence to discharge
this burden. Indeed, a number of the Argentine economic crisis decisions refer
extensively to the evidence of economic experts retained by investors. However,
in the case of smaller investors or individuals, it can be argued that this
requirement would place them at a disadvantage in dispute settlement.311
Whether this plays out in practice remains to be seen.
F. Limitations to Using WTO Law as a Comparator
Any comparison between WTO law and international investment law must
be sensitive to the differences between the two regimes. Alvarez and Brink
criticize the Continental Tribunal's recourse to WTO case law in determining
whether Argentina's emergency measures complied with the NPM clause in the
Argentina-US BIT. They argue that the Tribunal overlooked the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) rules of treaty interpretation and
underestimated the differences between the WTO Agreement and international
investment treaties. 312 In particular, they argue that the Tribunal should have
attempted to justify its recourse to WTO law through Article 31(3)(c) of the
VCLT, which provides that "any relevant rules of international law applicable in
the relations between the parties shall also be taken into account," as well as
other general rules of treaty interpretation. 313To be sure, the ContinentalTribunal
314
could have bolstered its analysis by reference to rules of treaty interpretation.
However, other international and supranational fora also interpret the concept
of necessity in the context of derogations, exceptions, and justifications for
conduct that is inconsistent with the primary norm in a similar way. The authors
do not take into account the prevalence of this approach by these other bodies
in rejecting the relevance of WTO tribunals' approach to necessity. A broader
perspective should consider how other international and supranational courts
and tribunals deal with similar issues.
Alvarez and Brink also criticize the ContinentalTribunalfor overlooking key
contextual differences between Article XI of the Argentina-US BIT and Article
XX of the GATT 1994. In particular, they point out that Article XI has no list
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of objectives similar to Article XX and also contains no chapeau.3"' In relation to
the chapeau, they argue that its requirements may have
subtly affected the degree of deference WTO dispute settlement accords to
WTO Members under that clause and what WTO panels and the Appellate
Body consider to be "necessary." There is arguably more leeway within the
necessity analysis in the GATT because States' measures under Article XX
(a)-) are, in the end, assessed against the chapeau of Article XX, which
prevents the application of regulatory interventions which are
discriminatory or protectionist .... 316
However, while it is arguable that the presence of the chapeau may lower
the standard of review with respect to the initial assessment of necessity under
one of the general exceptions' enumerated paragraphs, the difference between
the wording of the treaty provisions does not necessarily preclude investment
tribunals from adopting aspects of WTO necessity analysis. In the first place, the
influence of the chapeau on the necessity test under Article XX is no more than
a hypothesis, albeit an interesting one. But more importantly, the Appellate Body
has made clear that similar considerations, and a similarly structured test, apply
under the positive obligations of the SPS and TBT Agreements.317 Although
those Agreements do contain separate injunctions against arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination, they are not part of the necessity clauses. Moreover,
the Appellate Body has made clear that the legitimate objectives in Article 2.2 of
the TBT Agreement are an indicative list only,3"' demonstrating that the same
test can apply to measures that do not necessarily fall within a textual exception.
While Alvarez and Brink are right to caution that context must be taken into
account, they overstate their case by focusing too narrowly on Article XX rather
than on necessity in the WTO Agreements more generally.
VI. CONCLUSION
Investment tribunals have employed necessity analysis in a number of areas
of international investment law as reflected in provisions of investment treaties.
The first tranche of awards rendered against Argentina in respect of its
emergency measures adopted a strict approach to necessity that did not involve
consideration of issues such as the feasibility and likely effectiveness of
alternative measures.319 However, the Continental and LG&E32 decisions
315
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permitted far greater scope to Argentina to craft its legislative response to the
crisis within the framework of Article XI by adopting a more relaxed leastrestrictive means test. The LG&E decision accepted that states should-at least
in the context of an economic crisis-be afforded discretion in the
determination of whether a measure is necessary, provided such measures are
legitimate and reasonable in the circumstances. The Continental Tribunal
evidenced a more structured and deferential approach to least-restrictive means
analysis, echoing the approaches taken by other international and supranational
courts and tribunals, including WTO tribunals.321 Yet the Continental decision
glossed over certain essential elements of WTO tribunals' approaches to the
question of necessity in its analysis.
Investment tribunals have also employed necessity analysis in their
determination of whether legislative changes breach fair and equitable
treatment.3' In this context, some tribunals have employed necessity analysis
without appearing to consider whether the alternative measures they proposed
were equally effective and reasonably available to the host state. However, other
tribunals (and tribunal members in separate opinions) have employed a
"reasonable necessity" approach to legislative changes affecting investors,
indicating that host states should have the scope to select a measure within
certain boundaries. There do not appear to be any instances of cases in which
the tribunal set out an approach to indirect expropriation based solely on least
restrictive means analysis, although cases have referred to the concept as
relevant to determining whether a measure falls within the state's police powers
and therefore does not amount to expropriation. Finally, two tribunals used
necessity testing in the context of national treatment, 3' but most tribunals have
favored a less stringent nexus requirement. Overall, most investment tribunals
have not separately considered the importance of the host state's regulatory
objective or the suitability (effectiveness) of the measure in their assessment of
necessity.
By contrast to the relatively fragmented state of international investment
law, WTO tribunals have developed a relatively sophisticated jurisprudence with
respect to the concept of necessity.324 The WTO approach to necessity in the
context of the general exceptions entails review of the importance of a measure's
objective, a test of suitability (including considerations of a measure's
effectiveness and restrictive impact on trade), and an assessment of the
320
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availability of alternative measures.32 5 The suitability, or weighing and balancing
test, entails the assessment of the measure's degree of contribution to its
objective and the extent to which the measure restricts international trade. This
assessment is made against the backdrop of the assessment of the importance of
the regulatory objective, which has always been performed deferentially by WTO
tribunals. To be considered necessary, a measure need not have actually achieved
its objective and it may be enough that a measure is apt to do so in future,
particularly when the measure is one element of a suite of initiatives designed to
address a particular objective.3 26
Should a measure pass the legitimate objective and suitability stages of
review, a WTO tribunal will determine whether less trade-restrictive measures
exist that would achieve the Member's objective.327 Such measures must be
"reasonably available" to the respondent, in the sense of being feasible, not
imposing an "undue burden" on the Member, and meeting the Member's
desired level of protection (or level of achievement) of the objective in question.
Measures surviving this analysis are then reassessed for compliance with the
chapeau, which requires that measures are not applied in a manner constituting
"arbitrary or unjustifiable

discrimination"

or a "disguised

restriction on

international trade.
Necessity tests also appear in the SPS and TBT Agreements.329 Relevant
provisions of these agreements contain similar concepts to those relevant under
the general exceptions, including least restrictive means tests. The SPS
Agreement, however, provides Members with slightly greater autonomy. For
example, alternative measures must be "significantly" less trade restrictive, and
Members are penritted to determine and declare their appropriate level of
protection.330 Further, the SPS Agreement precludes the balancing of factors
such as importance, trade restrictiveness, and contribution to a legitimate
objective, thereby granting greater policy space to Members.331
Similarly to the SPS provisions, the TBT Agreement codifies a least
restrictive means test, providing that TBT measures must not be "more traderestrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective." 32 Legitimate objectives
include, but are not limited to, national security, the prevention of deceptive
"328
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practices, and the protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life
health, or the environment."' The Appellate Body has held that case law on the
general exceptions is relevant to the interpretation of the TBT Agreement,
despite the differences between the provisions." While Members have the right
to achieve their level of protection under the TBT Agreement, their right to
assert that level of protection is not absolute, as it appears to be under the SPS
Agreement. 3 The TBT Agreement also appears to provide a stricter leastrestrictive means test because the alternative only needs to be as effective as the
respondent's actual measure, rather than the chosen level of protection.336
Because the relevant provisions of the SPS and TBT Agreements contain
positive obligations rather than exceptions, the complainant must raise a prima
fade case that the measure infringes them before the burden switches to the
respondent to provide a rebuttal.33
There are four features of necessity testing in the WTO regime that
investment tribunals could be guided by, assuming that the relevant treaty
provision does not preclude such an approach. First, the assessment of the
importance of the objective that a measure is designed to achieve is an important
consideration. It is appropriate that investment tribunals make an assessment of
the importance of a measure's objective. Indeed, to refrain from doing so risks
approval of measures as "necessary" that are discriminatory or otherwise
impermissible. Yet the assessment of the importance of a measure's objective
carries with it the risk that a tribunal will substitute its own views as to the
importance of the objective for that of the host state, which may intrude into the
right of states to set their own legitimate policy priorities and level of protection
(or achievement) thereof. It is for this reason that tribunals should approach this
question with a measure of deference, as WTO tribunals have done. Investment
tribunals should also clearly explain and transparently undertake this analysis to
avoid undermining the right of states to determine their own legitimate policy
goals.
Another area in which investment tribunals could usefully take guidance
from WTO tribunals is in determining the extent to which a measure must
achieve its objective. WTO tribunals afford substantial deference to measures in
performing suitability analysis, in particular where measures form part of a
complex set of mutually supportive measures directed at achieving a particular
objective. A measure may be determined to be effective as long as it can be
M
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shown that the measure is "apt" to make a material contribution to the
achievement of its objective. Some investment tribunals have indirectly taken
this approach, but most have not addressed the question of the efficacy of a
measure in achieving its objective nor considered the degree of efficacy or
potential efficacy of measures.
Investment tribunals have in some cases adopted a relatively strict
approach to least-restrictive means testing, with tribunals holding that the
availability of measures made the impugned measure unnecessary without
proper consideration of alternative measures' feasibility in the circumstances. By
comparison, WTO tribunals inquire (in the context of the general exceptions) as
to whether alternative measures proposed by the complaining Member achieve
the respondent's chosen level of protection and whether the measure would
impose an "undue burden" in the form of prohibitive costs or technical
difficulties. Investment tribunals would do well to consider whether a host state
could actually adopt the proposed alternative, taking into account the state's
resources, technical and institutional capabilities and other circumstances.
Finally, WTO case law establishes that the burden of proof of the necessity
of a measure varies depending upon whether the obligation is an exception
(Article XX of the GATT and XIV of the GATS) or is a positive obligation.338
Investment tribunals have not adopted a consistent approach to the burden of
proof with respect to necessity. Following WTO case law, under NPM clauses
investors would only need to propose potential alternative measures, which is
not an onerous obligation. With respect to treaty provisions that impose positive
obligations, the investor would need to raise a prima facie case of inconsistency
by proposing (rather than merely pointing to) a plausible alternative measure.
Some have criticized the ContinentalTibunal's recourse to WTO case law
to guide their interpretation of the NPM clause in the Argentina-US BIT, on the
basis of the dissimilarities between the two instruments and their institutional
context.339 While the Continental decision is problematic insofar as it does not
entirely accurately represent WTO case law, these criticisms are overstated.
WTO law provides a rich source of jurisprudence for guiding investment
tribunals in their analysis of the concept of necessity for both exceptions and
positive obligations. WTO tribunals have, over the years, amassed a body of case
law that displays institutional sensitivity and is appropriately deferential to
national autonomy.
The appropriate level of regulatory autonomy in international investment
law may also be addressed through drafting of treaty provisions and through
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consideration of the public interest in damages awards. However, this article
proposes a means of accommodating these concerns through international
investment law with respect to state liability as it currently stands, building on
approaches taken by tribunals in the decided cases to date. Investment tribunals
should continue to seek guidance from WTO jurisprudence on necessity in a
way that accurately represents the relevant legal tests. Such an approach would
go some way toward the development of an appropriate means of delimiting
lawful state conduct from conduct in breach of investment treaty obligations
and the provision of greater certainty for host states and investors.
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